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DEEPWATER HORIZON AND THE LAW OF 
THE SEA: WAS THE CURE WORSE THAN 
THE DISEASE? 
Grant Wilson* 
Abstract: The number 4.9 million is commonly known as the number of 
barrels of crude oil that entered the Gulf of Mexico during the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill in 2010. Less known, but perhaps equally discon-
certing, is the number 1.7 million—the number of gallons of Corexit, a 
toxic dispersant used to mitigate oil spills, that was also released into the 
Gulf of Mexico. Some observers claim that Corexit spared shorelines, wet-
lands, and beaches from the worst of the oil spill. Others, however, argue 
that Corexit was at best a massive ecotoxicological experiment that could 
impair the marine environment for years. With a focus on the use of 
Corexit during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, this Article concludes 
that laws and regulations in the United States do not meet the standards 
set by Article 194 and Article 195 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In light of the overall purpose of UN-
CLOS to “protect and preserve the marine environment,” however, the 
United States might be able to meet the standards of at least Article 194 
by ensuring that the use of dispersants is authorized only if the disper-
sants result in a net environmental benefit and are the optimal disper-
sants to use for the unique situation of an oil spill. Finally, the future of oil 
spill remediation could involve genetically engineered microorganisms to 
clean up spills, but the United States regulatory regime does not seem to 
protect the marine environment from bioengineered microbes and 
therefore falls short of meeting the standards of Article 196 of UNCLOS, 
which regulates the introduction of alien or new species. Because UN-
CLOS represents customary international law, the United States should 
strive to meet the marine pollution provisions of the treaty. 
Introduction 
 Between April 20 and July 15, 2010, a series of human and me-
chanical errors caused approximately 4.9 million barrels of crude oil to 
                                                                                                                      
* Deputy Director at the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and J.D. from Lewis & 
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gush into the Gulf of Mexico.1 The spill began when a surge of gas 
from the Macondo Well—operated by the oil and gas behemoth British 
Petroleum (BP)—caught fire and caused explosions on the mobile off-
shore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon, whose crew was unable to close 
or disconnect the wellhead.2 On a fundamental level, the spill was 
caused by industry shortcuts and carelessness, the United States’s inad-
equate regulatory scheme, a culture of rubber stamping oil leases in 
the Gulf of Mexico, a conflict of interest between protecting the envi-
ronment and profiting from oil drilling, and bad luck.3 
 In response to the spill, an unprecedented amount of the disper-
sant Corexit—totaling more than 1.7 million gallons—was used in two 
locations: first, on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico, and second, ap-
proximately 5,000 feet underwater at the Macondo wellhead.4 The 
long-term ecological effects of dispersants are essentially unknown and 
have a potential to cripple ocean ecosystems.5 The short-term effects of 
dispersants might result in net-toxicity levels that are greater than that 
of the spilled oil itself.6 Therefore, the use of dispersants should receive 
intense scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Comparative Toxicity of Louisiana Sweet Crude Oil 
(LSC) and Chemically Dispersed LSC to Two Gulf of Mexico Aquatic Test Species 
2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/reports/phase2dispersant-toxtest.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/0qEt1rhkMgX. 
2 U.S. Coast Guard, Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Sur-
rounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard 
the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, at ix (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/xscNVs and http://perma.cc/0qW8hXyXHQb. 
3 See generally Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore 
Drilling (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/ 
pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf and http://perma.cc/0JE6uYc9DL9 (detailing regulato-
ry shortcomings preceding the Deepwater Horizon blowout). 
4 U.S. Coast Guard Incident Specific Preparedness Review Team, BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) 43 (2011) [herein-
after U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team], available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/ 
BPDWH.pdf and http://perma.cc/0QyJE68BcNd. 
5 Artin Laleian & Thomas Azwell, Deepwater Horizon Study Group, The Tradeoffs of 
Chemical Dispersant Use in Marine Oil Spills 4 ( Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at  http://goo.gl/Ycb8OC and http://perma.cc/0wx5y4Am7Ys (long-term effects 
of dispersants); Susan D. Shaw, Consensus Statement: Scientists Oppose the Use of 
Dispersant Chemicals in the Gulf of Mexico 3–4 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/ 
n3Tyfh and http://perma.cc/0ZCe3PG7Jvj (effects of dispersants on marine ecosystems). 
6 Roberto Rico-Martinez et al., Synergistic Toxicity of Macondo Crude Oil and Dispersant 
Corexit 9500A to the Brachionus Plicatilis Species Complex (Rotifera), 173 Envtl. Pollution 5, 
5–10 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/NOErXC and http://perma.cc/HAK7-XAH2; see 
also Shaw, supra note 5. 
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 One way to analyze the use of dispersants in response to the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill is through the framework of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).7 UNCLOS is an 
international treaty commonly known as the “the Constitution of the 
Oceans.”8 Although UNCLOS is not enforceable against the United 
States because America is not a party to the convention,9 the treaty is 
useful for determining whether the United States’s laws and regulations 
related to dispersants meet the standards set by international law. Fur-
thermore, UNCLOS provides a framework by which researchers, envi-
ronmentalists, and other interested parties may gauge the United 
States’s failure to protect the marine environment. 
 This Article first analyzes the background of dispersants, including 
Corexit, the dispersant used in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.10 Next, 
this Article explores the regulatory scheme of the National Contingen-
cy Plan (NCP), which governs the use of dispersants in the United 
States.11 This Article then analyzes UNCLOS as it applies to the use of 
dispersants and argues that the United States should abide by the treaty 
because it represents customary international law.12 This analysis leads 
to a conclusion that the United States’s failure to regulate the use of 
dispersants properly in response to oil spills likely falls short of the 
standards in Article 194 of UNCLOS.13 This Article then recommends a 
series of modifications to the United States’s regulation of dispersants 
that could allow the United States to authorize dispersant use in ob-
servance of Article 194.14 Finally, this Article concludes that the United 
                                                                                                                      
7 See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, A Constitution for the Oceans: A Closer Look at the United Na-
tions Law of the Sea Convention, Am. Bar Ass’n Insights on Law & Soc’y, Spring 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/insights_law_society/ 
constitution_Insightsspring06.authcheckdam.pdf and http://perma.cc/0ypXKn63RWf 
(providing a historical and practical overview of UNCLOS). 
8 Patricia C. Bauerlein, The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea & U.S. Ocean Environ-
mental Practice: Are We Complying with International Law?, 17 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
900, 922 (1995). 
9 United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Conven-
tion and of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Con-
vention Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 8 (2010), available at http://www.un.org/ 
depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf and http://perma.cc/0JXz66ovkHW. 
10 Infra notes 23–81 and accompanying text. 
11 Infra notes 82–179 and accompanying text. 
12 Infra notes 185–214 and accompanying text. 
13 Infra notes 231–295, 300–308, 315–342 and accompanying text. 
14 Infra notes 296–299, 309–314, 343–352 and accompanying text. 
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States’s authorization of dispersants falls short of the requirements of 
Article 195 of UNCLOS.15 
 Looking to the future, this Article briefly explores potential dan-
gers of using genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs), either as 
biosurfactants or as a form of bioremediation, to clean up oil spills.16 
This Article discusses “global catastrophic risks” (GCRs)—the risk of 
significant harm to humans on a global scale—and determines that alt-
hough GEMs do not present a GCR in the short-term, they might pose 
such a risk in the long-term, even though such risks are not currently 
well-understood.17 Next, this Article examines Article 196 of UNCLOS, 
which regulates the introduction of “alien or new” species that might 
cause significant and harmful changes to the marine environment.18 
This section of the Article concludes that the United States’s laws per-
taining to the release of GEMs into the marine environment do not 
seem to meet the standards imposed by Article 196 of UNCLOS.19 
I. Dispersants 
 An understanding of dispersants is necessary to comprehend the 
shortcomings of the laws and regulations related to their use. This part 
first discusses the general background behind dispersants used in oil 
spill cleanups.20 Then it discusses Corexit, the dispersant used in re-
sponse to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.21 Finally, this part explores 
the environmental costs, benefits, and unknowns of dispersant use in 
marine environments.22 
A. Dispersant Background 
 Dispersants are one of three primary remedial response mecha-
nisms to an oil spill, the other two being mechanical processes, which 
primarily consist of skimming oil from the water surface, and in-situ 
burning, or controlled burns of surface oil.23 Dispersants were used in 
                                                                                                                      
15 Infra notes 353–389 and accompanying text. 
16 Infra notes 390–438 and accompanying text. 
17 Infra notes 418–438 and accompanying text. 
18 Infra notes 439–513 and accompanying text. 
19 Infra notes 514–524 and accompanying text. 
20 Infra notes 23–32 and accompanying text. 
21 Infra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. 
22 Infra notes 40–81 and accompanying text. 
23 Reg’l Response Team 6, FOSC Dispersant Pre-Approval Guidelines and 
Checklist 1 (2001), available at http://www.losco.state.la.us/pdf_docs/RRT6_Dispersant_ 
Preapproval_2001.pdf and http://perma.cc/0y1fpFzhTXD. 
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two distinct settings in the Gulf of Mexico in response to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.24 The first was on the water’s surface, where approxi-
mately 1 million gallons of surface dispersants were applied, primarily 
by airplane and boat.25 The second was near the seafloor, where about 
770,000 gallons of dispersants were piped directly into the oil spewing 
from the Macondo wellhead.26 
 Most dispersants have two main ingredients: solvents and surfac-
tants.27 Generally speaking, surfactants coat the outside of oil droplets 
and prevent them from clumping, and solvents work to break up the 
oil.28 The intended effect is to break down an oil slick into small oil 
droplets that drift from the water’s surface into the water column29 as a 
result of low “rise velocity,” which is essentially buoyancy.30 The separat-
ed oil droplets form a light brown or gray oil plume—or more accu-
rately, an oil cloud—that drifts into the water column.31 Microorganisms 
can more easily biodegrade the resultant small droplets of oil.32 
B. Corexit and Basic Toxicity Theory 
 Corexit was the only dispersant used in response to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, both on the surface and subsurface waters of the Gulf 
of Mexico.33 BP used two types of Corexit: EC9527A (Corexit 9527) and 
                                                                                                                      
24 See U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 43. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. The official numbers of both surface and subsurface dispersants have been ques-
tioned, and some researchers estimate that as many as 4 million gallons of dispersants were 
used in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Sen. A.G. Crowe, “Clean Our Gulf” 
Petition, Louisiana Senate, http://www.agcrowe.com/pg-51–47-Clean-The-Gulf-Petition. 
aspx, available at http://www.perma.cc/0Log8jtV4zT. 
27 Peter Lane, The Use of Chemicals in Oil Spill Response 299 (1995). 
28 Tom Levitt & Nicole Edmison, Toxic Dispersants in Gulf Oil Spill Creating Hidden Ma-
rine Crisis, Ecologist (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/ 
583740/toxic_dispersants_in_gulf_oil_spill_creating_hidden_marine_crisis.html, available 
at http://perma.cc/0ZBkwcX5K9p. 
29 The water column is essentially the opposite of the ocean surface; it is the water below 
the ocean surface all the way down to the ocean floor. See Water Column, Ecologydiction-
ary.com, http://www.ecologydictionary.org/water_column (last visited Nov. 11, 2013), avail-
able at http://perma.cc/02pY7JcSoGW. 
30 SINTEF, Oil Spill Dispersants 7 (2007), available at http://documents.plant.wur. 
nl/imares/dispersants/08sintef.pdf and http://perma.cc/0Fi9TkgySEr. 
31 Id. at 8. 
32 Int’l Tanker Owners Pollution Fed’n, Use of Dispersants to Treat Oil Spills 2 
(2011), available at http://www.itopf.com/information-services/publications/documents/ 
TIP4UseofDispersantstoTreatOilSpills.pdf and http://perma.cc/0qjMHPhU9xM. 
33 Norwegian Inst. for Water Research, Environmental Effects of the Deep-
water Horizon Oil Spill: Focus on Effects on Fish and Effects of Dispersants 12 
(2012), available at  http://goo.gl/BmLFcI and http://perma.cc/0EvTYF2LcTf. 
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EC9500 (Corexit 9500).34 Nalco Energy Services, L.P., based in Sugar 
Land, Texas, manufactures both types.35 
 Testing has found Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527 to have some 
level of toxicity.36 The toxicity of Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527, like all 
chemical dispersants, varies based on conditions such as water tempera-
ture and length of exposure.37 The toxicity of dispersants also differs 
significantly among different marine species and according to other 
variables such as a species’ size and maturity.38 For example, fish are 
generally less sensitive to the toxicity of dispersants than are mollusks, 
and young animals are more sensitive to the toxicity of dispersants than 
are adults.39 
C. Environmental Impacts of Dispersants 
 Experts, scientists, and commentators frequently use the word 
“trade-off” to describe the effect of dispersants on the marine environ-
ment.40 In general, the environmental tradeoff is shoreline and surface 
damage (when no dispersants are used) for pelagic and deep-sea dam-
age (when dispersants are used).41 David Smith, professor of oceanog-
raphy at the University of Rhode Island, has stated, “Moving oil below 
the sea surface presents significant challenges to the organisms residing 
in this habitat. Impacts will be less noticeable, but could be as devastat-
                                                                                                                      
34 Timothy R. Kelley, Environmental Health Insights into the 2010 Deepwater Horizon (BP) 
Oil Blowout, 4 Envtl. Health Insights 61, 62 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2934613/ and http://perma.cc/UP28-56XA. 
35 Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Contingency Plan Product Schedule 3 
(2010), available at http://goo.gl/zlmFVX and http://perma.cc/0gc7V3z9see. 
36 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Guide to Using the NCP Subpart J Product Schedule 
Technical Notebook 3, 13 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/ 
notebook.pdf and http://perma.cc/0LQBeLrZkEY. 
37 Anita George-Ares & James R. Clark, Acute Aquatic Toxicity of Three Corexit Products: An 
Overview, 1 Int’l Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 1007, 1007 (1997), available at http:// 
ioscproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-1997-1-1007 and http://perma.cc/0sYhM 
r4j9Sn. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See, e.g., Associated Press, Dispersants Used on Gulf Oil Spill an Ecological Trade-Off, Ex-
perts Say, AL.Com (May 5, 2010), http://blog.al.com/live/2010/05/dispersants_used_on_ 
gulf_oil_s.html, available at http://perma.cc/0DC3y1nSTNh; see also Matthew L. Wald, The 
Politics of Dispersants, N.Y. Times (Aug. 4, 2010), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/ 
08/04/the-politics-of-dispersants/?_r=0, available at http://perma.cc/0Ls53mpLsCq (not-
ing that government witnesses at a Senate hearing on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill “re-
peatedly described the use of dispersants as a trade-off”). 
41 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 1, at 2 (mentioning the tradeoff between 
shoreline and deep sea damage). 
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ing as oil washing ashore.”42 So, if BP and the U.S. government chose in 
favor of sweeping the oil under the carpet, so to speak, the question 
remains: Was it a good tradeoff? In other words, did the use of disper-
sants result in net environmental neutrality (a fair tradeoff), a net envi-
ronmental benefit (a favorable tradeoff), or a net environmental loss (a 
bad tradeoff)?43 Overall, the answer is unclear. Although there are many 
positive and negative environmental consequences of dispersant use, 
the unknowns are such that it is currently impossible to conclude defin-
itively whether the use of dispersants in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
resulted in a net environmental benefit.44 
1. Positive Environmental Effects 
 Dispersants, including Corexit, have many positive effects that 
should be considered in determining whether their use results in a net 
environmental benefit.45 For example, dispersants reduce the amount 
of oil that reaches shorelines and wetlands, where oil removal is more 
difficult than at sea.46 Dispersants also help to protect salt marshes, cor-
al reefs, sea grasses, and mangroves.47 Even if dispersed oil washes 
ashore, it has a less detrimental effect on the shoreline than does non-
dispersed oil.48 Dispersants also reduce the amount of oil that surface-
dwelling and shoreline species contact and ingest.49 For example, dis-
                                                                                                                      
42 Oversight Hearing on the Use of Oil Dispersants in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Before the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of David 
C. Smith, professor at University of Rhode Island, Graduate School of Oceanography), 
available at http://goo.gl/b5cG2w and http://perma.cc/MG2Z-67SW; Jonathan Tilove, 
EPA Official Defends Role of Dispersants in Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response, Times-Picayune 
(Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/08/epa_official_ 
defends_role_of_d.html, available at http://perma.cc/0SqAdRxjeY4. 
43 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 40 (dispersants in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as a 
tradeoff). 
44 Jonathan L. Ramseur, Congressional Research Service, Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill: The Fate of the Oil 6 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R41531.pdf and http://perma.cc/0CVvQrDBXyK (“While dispersants have proven effec-
tive in breaking up the oil, impacts from the chemically dispersed oil (and the chemical 
dispersants) are unknown.”); see also Questions and Answers on Dispersants, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-qanda.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013), 
available at http://perma.cc/0QRyTPCWHsz. 
45 See, e.g., Region IV Reg’l Response Team, Use of Dispersants in Region IV 39 
(2010), available at http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/Resources/ 
DUP/$file/1-RRT4DISP.PDF and http://perma.cc/0tVzi8V4XXb. 
46 See id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 35. 
49 Id. at 39. 
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persants can help to prevent the formation of tar balls, which sea turtles 
have been known to ingest.50 
 Furthermore, even though dispersants cause some oil to drift into 
the water column and harm subsurface species, such oil has been dilut-
ed into small droplets that mix with ocean water, and the result is that 
subsurface species are exposed to a lower oil concentration for a short-
er duration than surface species would be in the absence of disper-
sants.51 Also, because dispersed oil has a lower oil concentration and 
persists for a shorter amount of time, pelagic organisms (those in the 
water column) might not accumulate the oil dispersed in the water 
column in significant amounts.52 Even if species do ingest toxic disper-
sants, “biomagnification” might not be a significant problem.53 One 
study has concluded that the “metabolism of surfactants is rapid 
enough that there is little likelihood of food chain transfer from ma-
rine invertebrates and fish to predators . . . .”54 
2. Negative Environmental Effects 
 Dispersants, including Corexit, have many known negative envi-
ronmental effects that might not outweigh the benefits.55 First, disper-
sants are toxic and can be fatal to a wide array of marine species.56 Alt-
hough many dispersants, including Corexit, are intended to bio-
degrade relatively quickly, this outcome does not always occur.57 One 
year after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, researchers discovered that 
dioctyl sulfosuccinate sodium salt (DOSS), Corexit’s active ingredient, 
has not “significantly degraded,” while the fate of other Corexit com-
ponents remains unknown.58 
 Marine species are especially vulnerable to the negative effects of 
dispersants.59 Dispersants can destroy the protective waterproofing and 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. 
51 SINTEF, supra note 30, at 23. 
52 See J.M. Neff, Sea Mammals and Oil: Confronting the Risks 24 ( J.R. Geraci & 
D.J. St. Aubi eds., 1990); Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 40. 
53 See Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 40. 
54 Id. 
55 See Rico-Martinez et al., supra note 6, at 5–10; Shaw, supra note 5, at 3–4; Ramseur, 
supra note 44, at 6; Questions and Answers on Dispersants, supra note 44. 
56 David Biello, One Year After BP Oil Spill, At Least 1.1 Million Barrels Still Missing, Sci. 
Am. (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=one-year-after-bp-
oil-spill-millions-of-barrels-oil-missing, available at http://perma.cc/04VfnvNNqQd. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., Craig Pittman, Three Years After BP Oil Spill, USF Research Finds Massive Die-Off, 
Tampa Bay Times (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/water/ 
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insulating features common to many birds and mammals.60 The sol-
vents found in many dispersants, including Corexit, are also carcino-
genic to some animals.61 Unfortunately, dispersants have started to ap-
pear in marine species: Tulane University discovered small amounts of 
Corexit in the larvae of blue crabs, for example.62 And although sur-
face-dwelling and shoreline species are exposed to less oil when disper-
sants are used, water column-dwelling species, such as larval fish and 
shrimp, experience increased exposure to oil as a consequence of their 
habitat’s location.63 A 2013 study of the effects of oil and Corexit 9500 
on coral larvae found that Corexit 9500 increased larval mortality for 
certain species and can impact coral reef resilience and recovery from 
oil and dispersant exposure.64 
 Dispersants also create oil plumes that present their own risks be-
cause of a significantly larger surface area as compared to oil slicks.65 
For example, large plumes of oil droplets and dispersant—one plume 
was reportedly “200-meters high, two-kilometers wide, and 35-
kilometers long”66—can potentially cause significant harm to small 
ocean species such as bacteria, phytoplankton, zooplankton, and lar-
vae.67 Larvae in particular are extremely susceptible to these harms be-
cause contact with oil plumes and dispersants often results in death.68 
Perhaps most alarming is that dispersants and the oil-degrading organ-
isms feasting on giant oil plumes might have contributed to a “thick 
layer of oil” found on the seafloor of the Gulf of Mexico, which could 
                                                                                                                      
gulf-oil-spill-killed-millions-of-microscopic-creatures-at-base-of-food/2113157, available at 
http://perma.cc/0AreQv7fVsE. 
60 Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 39. 
61 Biello, supra note 56. 
62 Rick Jervis, Research Team Finds Oil on Bottom of Gulf, USA Today (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010–10–25-oilresearch25_ST_N.htm, available at 
http://perma.cc/07yUv8jBBMa. 
63 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Use of Chemical Dispersants for Marine Oil Spills 29 
(1993), available at http://goo.gl/SXm98h; see also Shaw, supra note 5, at 3. 
64 See generally Gretchen Goodbody-Gringley et al., Toxicity of Deepwater Horizon Source Oil 
and the Chemical Dispersant, Corexit 9500, to Coral Larvae, 8(1) PLOS ONE 1 (2013), available 
at http://goo.gl/Kr92VD and http://perma.cc/S7TQ-WAWA (analyzing effects of Corexit 
on coral larvaee and the resulting impact on coral reefs). 
65 See Sara Kennedy, Researchers Confirm Subsea Gulf Oil Plumes Are from BP Well, 
McClatchy DC ( July 23, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/23/98088/re- 
searchers-confirm-subsea-gulf.html, available at http://perma.cc/0XpgbLZCa4c. 
66 Biello, supra note 56. 
67 Naomi Klein, The Search for BP’s Oil, Nation ( Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.thenation. 
com/article/157723/search-bps-oil, available at http://perma.cc/VRV3-NVN6. 
68 See id. (quoting a government fisheries biologist as stating that “any larvae that came 
into contact with the oil doesn’t have a chance”). 
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threaten ocean floor-dwelling species and potentially disrupt the entire 
marine food chain.69 
 Finally, by dispersing and submerging oil, dispersants increase the 
difficulty of “skimming” oil from the ocean’s surface, which is the most 
environmentally friendly of all oil spill remediation techniques.70 Like-
wise, dispersants also increase the difficulty of conducting in-situ burn-
ing of oil slicks.71 
3. Unknown Environmental Effects 
 Although the positive and negative effects of dispersants are doc-
umented, scientists actually have very little knowledge about the overall 
effects of dispersants on the marine environment.72 The testimonies of 
leading experts at a 2010 Senate researchers panel about the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill were largely focused on the uncertainties sur-
rounding dispersant usage.73 For example, Professor Ronald Kendall of 
Texas Tech University commented that “we are conducting a massive 
ecotoxicological experiment.”74 On the same panel, David Smith of the 
University of Rhode Island remarked that “we know nothing of how the 
deep sea works.”75 Previous studies on dispersants have focused primar-
ily on oil spill cleanup workers,76 and very few have addressed the issue 
of how low-dose dispersants affect the marine ecosystem over a long 
time period. The widespread use of dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico 
will have some environmental impact, but the precise scope and severity 
of this impact remains unknown.77 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Richard Harris, Scientists Find Thick Layer of Oil on Seafloor, NPR (Sept. 10. 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129782098&ft=1&f=1007, availa-
ble at http://perma.cc/07V6L2B1JCp. 
70 See Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, Observations, 
Questions and Recommendations Regarding Use of Dispersants on the BP Deep-
water Horizon Spill 4 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/IxPySa and http://perma.cc/ 
0GUHf2myTSr; see also Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, supra note 3, at 169. 
71 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 70, at 2; 
Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, su-
pra note 3, at 169. 
72 See Use of Dispersants in Gulf Oil Spill, Researchers Panel, C-SPAN (Aug. 4, 2012), http:// 
www.c-spanvideo.org/program/294897-2, available at http://perma.cc/0QrUbA4QGqN 
(statement from Ronald Kendall, to the Senate Environment & Public Works Subcommittee 
on Oversight, regarding the uncertainty surrounding dispersant use). 
73 See id. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. (statement from David Smith). 
76 Courtney Farrell, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill 67–68 (2011). 
77 Id. at 63. 
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 Before 770,000 gallons of Corexit were piped directly into the leak-
ing Macondo wellhead, subsurface dispersants had never been used, so 
there is essentially no scientific data on the effects of dispersants ap-
plied anywhere but on the surface water.78 In fact, none of the Regional 
Contingency Plans that pre-authorize dispersants even contemplate the 
use of subsurface dispersants.79 There are significant unknowns about 
the biodegradation of dispersants in the deep ocean, and a 2013 study 
suggests that Corexit 9500 biodegrades more slowly in the colder tem-
peratures of the deep ocean.80 Many scientists agree that significant 
research must be conducted to determine the long-term and short-
term effects of subsurface dispersant use.81 
II. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP) 
 The NCP regulates the use of dispersants during oil spills.82 This 
part first introduces Subpart J of the NCP (“Subpart J”), which regu-
lates the listing of dispersants in the NCP Product Schedule.83 This part 
then examines the “high level organizations” and “regional plans” that 
carry out the NCP, including a discussion of the “pre-authorization” of 
dispersants listed in the NCP Product Schedule by Regional Response 
Teams (RRTs) and Area Committees (ACs).84 This part then analyzes 
certain aspects of the Dispersant Use Plans of RRT IV and RRT VI, 
which are the RRTs for the two Federal Regions of primary relevance 
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.85 Finally, as part of a timeline of 
events, this part analyzes how and why Corexit was chosen as the pri-
mary dispersant for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.86 
                                                                                                                      
78 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Oil Dispersants: Additional Research 
Needed, Particularly on Subsurface and Arctic Applications 12, 22 (2012), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591232.pdf and http://perma.cc/02nT2vNc1SD. 
79 Id. at 12. 
80 Mark Schrope, Oil Dispersants Used During Gulf Spill Degrade Slowly in Cold Water, 
Chemical & Engineering News (Feb. 13, 2013), http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/web/ 
2013/02/Oil-Dispersants-Used-During-Gulf.html, available at http://perma.cc/KJN4-QFW4. 
81 See, e.g., Christopher Joyce, Lasting Impact of Dispersants Unclear, Senate Told, NPR (Aug. 
4, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128983162, available at 
http://perma.cc/5QU3-9H4N; see also infra notes 344–346 and accompanying text. 
82 Infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
83 Infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
84 Infra notes 100–136 and accompanying text. 
85 Infra notes 137–145 and accompanying text. 
86 Infra notes 146–184 and accompanying text. 
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A. Subpart J 
 The Clean Water Act,87 the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the NCP 
require the Regulatory and Policy Division of the EPA’s Office of 
Emergency Management to develop an “NCP Product Schedule” that 
lists dispersants pursuant to the requirements of Subpart J.88 Disper-
sants are pre-authorized for use primarily because they are most effec-
tive when used immediately after an oil spill.89 Listing a dispersant in 
the NCP Product Schedule, however, does not mean that it is automati-
cally authorized for use in an oil spill.90 Rather, the NCP Product 
Schedule contains dispersants that may be approved for use in response 
to an oil spill.91 
 The NCP Product Schedule is comprised of five product catego-
ries: dispersants, surface washing agents, surface collecting agents, bio-
remediation agents, and miscellaneous oil spill control agents.92 For 
the EPA to approve a dispersant, the producer must satisfy a series of 
“data requirements,” which include, inter alia, testing for toxicity and 
effectiveness.93 Test results are sent to the EPA’s Product Schedule 
Manager for approval.94 The only requirement is that the dispersant 
must achieve forty-five percent effectiveness; that is, forty-five percent of 
the oil must be dispersed by a “swirling test” that mixes oily seawater 
with a dispersant in a flask.95 Many commentators have argued that the 
approval process for dispersants is inadequate for protecting the ma-
rine environment.96 
 As discussed below, once a dispersant is listed in the NCP Product 
Schedule, the use of that dispersant may be pre-authorized by an RRT 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2) (2006). 
88 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 36, at i. 
89 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 43. 
90 As the EPA’s NCP Product Schedule states on the first page, “This listing does NOT 
mean that EPA approves, recommends, licenses, certifies, or authorizes the use of [Prod-
uct Name] on an oil discharge. The listing means only that data have been submitted to 
EPA as required by Subpart J of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, Section 300.915.” See Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Contingency 
Plan Product Schedule 1 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/ 
schedule.pdf and http://perma.cc/APC7-FSDB. 
91 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.900 (2013). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. § 300.920(a)(1) (establishing how to add dispersants to the NCP Product Sched-
ule); id. § 300.915(a) (providing the data requirements for dispersants). 
94 Id. § 300.900. 
95 See Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 115. 
96 See U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 40–44. 
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or an AC in any Federal Region.97 If a particular dispersant is pre-
authorized, then the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) may uni-
laterally permit that dispersant’s use in response to an oil spill. 98 On 
the other hand, if a particular dispersant is not pre-authorized, then the 
FOSC must seek approval from RRT representatives from the EPA and, 
as appropriate, the affected state; the FOSC must also consult with U.S. 
Department of Commerce (DOC) and U.S. Department of Interior 
(DOI) natural resource trustees.99 
B. The NCP’s High-Level Organizations and Regional Plans 
 The basic function of the NCP is to ensure that there are sufficient 
resources available in the event of a spill or hazardous substance release 
that is too large for state and local resources to handle.100 To achieve 
this goal, the NCP lays out a national response framework for oil and 
hazardous substance releases through the National Response System 
(NRS),101 which is a group of federal, regional, and local teams and 
individuals.102 The NCP is also carried out by several “high level organi-
zations”103—the National Response Team (NRT), RRTs, and the 
FOSC.104 The NCP is also carried out by regional “plans.”105 
                                                                                                                      
97 See infra notes 109–115 and accompanying text. 
98 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(c). 
99 An exception is that an FOSC may authorize a dispersant without pre-authorization 
if the FOSC believes that “the use of the product is necessary to prevent or substantially 
reduce a hazard to human life.” See id. § 300.900(a). 
100 See Region 6 Reg’l Response Team, Interim Regional Integrated Contingency 
Plan 4 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/JzK0Sd and http://perma.cc/ZT97-J8M8. 
101 Id. 
102 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
Decision-Making Within the Unified Command (Draft) 2 (2010), available at http:// 
www.courthousenews.com/2010/10/08/OilSpillReport.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/ 
0YfJmJFVxhf; see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://www.perma.cc/0bcDAYKe9xZ. 
103 National Response System, National Response Center, http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/ 
nrsinfo.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://www.perma.cc/0BaFYEJ45tH. 
104 Although there are many other relevant organizations that are integral in imple-
menting the NCP, they are not pertinent to an analysis of the regulation of dispersants. Id. 
(describing the four “special force” components of the National Response System). 
105 Although the NCP deals with oil spills and hazardous waste releases, this Article on-
ly addresses elements of the NCP relating to oil spills. 
76 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:63 
1. National Response Team (NRT) 
 The NRT is comprised of representatives from sixteen federal de-
partments and agencies.106 The NRT’s roles and responsibilities include 
“planning and coordinating responses to major discharges of oil or 
hazardous waste, providing guidance to Regional Response Teams, co-
ordinating a national program of preparedness planning and response, 
and facilitating research to improve response activities.”107 NRTs are 
used in scenarios where, inter alia, the capabilities of regional response 
teams are exceeded, spills transcend regional boundaries, human or 
environmental health is substantially threatened, or the NRT’s assis-
tance is requested by a NRT member or the FOSC.108 
2. Regional Response Teams (RRTs) 
 Although there is only one NRT, there are thirteen RRTs— “one 
for each of the ten federal regions” and three others.109 An RRT con-
sists of representatives from federal agencies, state governments, and 
local governments.110 RRTs have a “standing team” and an “incident-
specific team.”111 The standing team is responsible for planning “pre-
paredness actions” in its respective Federal Region, which includes 
three major responsibilities: (1) planning for a spill; (2) training feder-
al, state, tribal, and local agencies to react to a spill; and (3) coordinat-
ing responses.112 An RRT is also responsible for creating a Regional 
Contingency Plan (RCP)113 in which the RRT may pre-authorize dis-
persants for use in its respective Federal Region.114 The U.S. Coast 
Guard leads an RRT for a spill in coastal or Great Lakes waters, while 
the EPA leads an RRT anywhere else.115 
                                                                                                                      
106 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 102, at 2. 
107 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, supra note 
102. 
108 Region 6 Reg’l Response Team, supra note 100, at 7. 
109 RRT Home Pages, National Response Team, http://www.rrt.nrt.org (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://www.perma.cc/0f4AWhonLut. 
110 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 102, at 2. 
111 40 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)(1)–(2) (2013). 
112 Region 6 Reg’l Response Team, supra note 100, at 8. 
113 Id. 
114 Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Inspector General, Revisions Needed to Na-
tional Contingency Plan Based on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 12 (2011), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/20110825-11-P-0534.pdf and http://perma. 
cc/LA8K-VPUP. 
115 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(a)(1)–(2). 
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3. Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) 
 During an incident, the main function of an RRT is to assist the 
FOSC,116 who is the primary official that coordinates the federal re-
sponse effort.117 The FOSC is a federal official from the EPA for inland 
spills or the U.S. Coast Guard for coastal oil spills and oil spills in the 
Great Lakes.118 The FOSC organizes, directs, and reviews several other 
actors, including local, state, tribal, and regional agencies, responsible 
parties, and contractors.119 The FOSC is also in charge of ensuring 
compliance with the NCP, RCPs, Area Contingency Plans (ACPs), ad-
ministrative orders, and other authoritative sources.120 Notably, the 
FOSC may unilaterally allow the use of any dispersant pre-authorized by 
an RRT, provided that the FOSC adheres to any conditions imposed in 
an RRT’s Dispersant Use Plan.121 During the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill, the FOSC initially approved the unlimited use of Corexit by Brit-
ish Petroleum (BP), as was permitted by RRT IV’s and RRT VI’s Disper-
sant Use Plans.122 
4. Dispersant Use Plans in Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs), Area 
Contingency Plans (ACPs), and Regional Integrated Contingency 
Plans (RICPs)123 
 According to Subpart J, RRTs and ACs may pre-authorize the use of 
dispersants in an RCP or an ACP,124 and specific conditions may be im-
posed on the use of those pre-authorized dispersants.125 RCPs, created 
by RRTs in their respective Federal Regions, govern the response efforts 
of all federal, state, and local agencies within any one of the thirteen 
                                                                                                                      
116 RRT Home Pages, supra note 109. 
117 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(a). 
118 Id.; id. § 300.5. 
119 Region 6 Reg’l Response Team, supra note 100, at 12. 
120 See, e.g., id. at 12–13. 
121 See id. at 41. 
122 See Combating the BP Oil Spill: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Envi-
ronment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (May 27, 2010) (statement of 
EPA administrator Lisa P. Jackson, discussing the initial approval of Corexit), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg76583/html/CHRG-111hhrg76583.htm and 
http://perma.cc/0s6fQekvSKm. 
123 Plans exist other than those listed here, but these are the plans most relevant to the 
use of dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico. 
124 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(a) (2013). 
125 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 42. 
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Federal Regions.126 One, several, or all of the dispersants listed in the 
NCP Product Schedule may be pre-authorized by an RRT in an RCP’s 
Dispersant Use Plan. The EPA’s RRT representative, states with jurisdic-
tion over the water pre-authorized for dispersant use, and the DOC and 
DOI natural resource trustees must all approve pre-authorization of dis-
persants.127 The RRT also has the authority to require dispersant manu-
facturers to conduct more testing of toxicity and effectiveness than is 
required for listing on the NCP Product Schedule.128 
 Like RCPs, ACPs pre-authorize a dispersant for use in response to 
an oil spill.129 ACPs are created to remove, mitigate, and prevent a 
worst-case discharge.130 There are one or more ACPs for every one of 
the thirteen Federal Regions.131 Unlike an RCP, ACPs are created by 
ACs, which include representatives from certain federal, state, and local 
agencies.132 A third type of plan, an RICP, may be used to integrate an 
RCP and ACP so that an FOSC and other authorities can respond to an 
oil spill with optimal speed.133 
 Although pre-authorization of a dispersant allows an FOSC to uni-
laterally permit the use of that dispersant in an oil spill, a Dispersant 
Use Plan may pre-authorize an FOSC to use it only in “specific con-
texts.”134 For example, pre-authorization can vary based upon the “po-
tential sources and types of oil that might be spilled, the existence and 
location of environmentally sensitive resources that might be impacted 
by spilled oil, available product and storage locations, available equip-
ment and adequately trained operators, and the available means to 
monitor the product application and effectiveness.”135 On the other 
hand, if not pre-authorized at all, dispersants may be used only when an 
                                                                                                                      
126 There are ten standard federal regions and three non-standard federal regions. 
The three non-standard federal regions with RCPs (and RRTs) are Alaska, the Caribbean, 
and the Pacific Basin. See RRT Home Pages, supra note 109. 
127 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(a). 
128 See id. 
129 Id. 
130 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(C) (2006). 
131 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Area Contingency Planning Handbook 6 (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/oil/frp/EPA_ACP_Handbook.pdf and http:// 
perma.cc/09k23PmMsmb. 
132 Curry L. Hagerty & Jonathan L. Ramseur, Congressional Research Service, 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress 8 (2010), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf and http://perma.cc/43VZ-KTGB. 
133 See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regional Integrated Contingency Plan, EPA 
Region 7 § 300.1 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/region7/cleanup/superfund/ 
pdf/ricp_complete.pdf and http://perma.cc/3MER-V9RQ. 
134 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. E 4.4(a) (2013). 
135 See id. § 300.910(a). 
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FOSC seeks approval from the EPA and affected states and consults 
with DOC and DOI representatives.136 
C. Federal Regions IV and VI in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 Two RRTs whose RCPs were activated during the Deepwater Hori-
zon oil spill, RRT IV (comprised of U.S. states on the northwest side of 
the Gulf of Mexico) and RRT VI (comprised of U.S. states on the 
northeast side of the Gulf of Mexico), both pre-authorized Corexit and 
many other dispersants with limited conditions.137 For example, the 
RCP for RRT VI gave the FOSC full discretion to use Corexit at any 
volume in any pre-authorized location on the condition that the FOSC 
merely conduct a “test application” of the dispersant, the results of 
which do not have to be approved.138 Otherwise, any dispersant listed 
in the NCP Product schedule may be used at any volume, so long as the 
water is more than ten meters deep and three miles offshore.139 
 Similarly, the RCP for RRT IV essentially provides blanket authori-
zation for dispersant approval and requires only that the “dispersant 
must be included on the NCP Product Schedule and considered ap-
propriate by the FOSC for existing environmental and physical condi-
tions.”140 RRT IV did, however, exclude some particularly sensitive areas 
from its pre-authorization,141 and the Dispersant Use Policy in RRT IV 
contains “information to be considered” by the FOSC, including, inter 
alia, laboratory testing, visual monitoring, water sampling, safety of dis-
persal (including wind speed and visibility), sufficiency of personnel for 
aerial dispersal, completion of a “site safety plan,” and whether an 
“overflight” to consider visible endangered species has occurred.142 
Consideration of these precautionary measures is not obligatory, and 
therefore the FOSC may unilaterally approve the use of dispersants.143 
Otherwise, much like RRT VI, RRT IV’s Dispersant Use Plan only re-
quires that oil dispersants be used in water at least ten feet deep and 
three miles offshore.144 
                                                                                                                      
136 See id. § 300.910(b). 
137 Infra notes 138–145 and accompanying text. 
138 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 42. 
139 Id. 
140 See Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 6–11. 
141 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 40. 
142 Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 96–103, 115. 
143 See U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 40. 
144 See id. 
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 Finally, neither of the Dispersant Use Plans in RRT VI and RRT IV 
limits the amount of dispersant nor the method by which it would be 
dispersed, which thus permitted the novel application of subsurface 
dispersants at the Macondo wellhead.145 
D. Timeline of Events in Using the Dispersant Corexit 
 On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling unit exploded, 
and oil began spewing from the Macondo wellhead into the Gulf of 
Mexico.146 The NCP applied at this point, and the U.S. Coast Guard 
designated an FOSC.147 Pursuant to the Dispersant Use Plans for Fed-
eral Regions IV and VI, the FOSC authorized BP’s request to use the 
dispersant Corexit, and more than 14,000 gallons were subsequently 
applied during the first week of the spill.148 On April 29, 2010, Secre-
tary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano designated the spill a “Spill 
of National Significance,” which resulted in the activation of the ACP.149 
1. The FOSC Permits BP to Use Corexit 
 Dispersants were applied in significant amounts to both the sur-
face and subsurface areas of the Gulf of Mexico.150 Because subsurface 
dispersants had never been used before, some officials were uncer-
tain151 whether the subsurface application was permitted under RRT VI 
and RRT IV’s respective Dispersant Use Plans.152 Nevertheless, the EPA 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. 
146 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Prelimi-
nary Assessment of Federal Financial Risks and Cost Reimbursement and Notifi-
cation Policies and Procedures 1 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d1190r.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0zV7XsfPVSE. 
147 Deepwater BP Oil Spill, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/deepwater-bp-oil-
spill (last visited Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/J32E-ZHNN. 
148 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 3, at 144. 
149 The activation of the ACP did not impinge on the FOSC’s duties as established un-
der the NCP. See DHS Planning & Response: Preliminary Lessons from Deepwater Horizon, Hear-
ing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 86 (2010) (testimony of 
Admiral Peter Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander, U.S. Coast Guard), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg66030/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg 
66030.pdf. 
150 See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
151 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, The Use of Surface and Subsea Dispersants During the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill 8 (2011). 
152 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 3, at 7. 
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and Coast Guard jointly endorsed the use of subsurface dispersants on 
May 15, 2010.153 By May 17, 2010, about 580,000 gallons of surface dis-
persants and 45,000 gallons of subsurface dispersants had already been 
used.154 
2. Public Outcry and Prior Testing of Corexit from the NCP Product 
Schedule 
 Public outcry soon erupted over the use of Corexit.155 The data on 
dispersants—related to the effectiveness and toxicity tests that a disper-
sant manufacturer sends to the EPA for listing on the NCP Product 
Schedule—showed several less toxic, more effective alternatives to 
Corexit.156 Several types of dispersants were listed on the EPA’s NCP 
Product Schedule, including the two types of Corexit used in the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.157 The application for listing a dispersant 
in the NCP Product Schedule requires a dispersant manufacturer to 
test for toxicity158 and effectiveness, as tested primarily with “No. 2 fuel 
oil.”159 For toxicity, tests are performed on two species and for two dif-
ferent durations: a 96-hour test on Menidia fish and a 48-hour test on 
Mysidopsis (a Gulf of Mexico-dwelling crustacean).160 For the Menidia 
fish, Corexit 9500A mixed with No. 2 Fuel Oil is more toxic than any 
other dispersant on the NCP Product Schedule, while Corexit 9527A 
mixed with No. 2 Fuel Oil is the sixth most toxic of twenty-three listed 
                                                                                                                      
153 Id. at 8. 
154 The Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the BP Oil Spill, White House (May 5, 
2010, 5:55 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/05/ongoing-administration-
wide-response-deepwater-bp-oil-spill, available at http://www.perma.cc/0nizUcJti88. 
155 See, e.g., Elana Schor, Ingredients of Controversial Dispersants Used on Gulf Spill Are Se-
crets No More, N.Y. Times ( June 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/09/ 
09greenwire-ingredients-of-controversial-dispersants-used-42891.html, available at http:// 
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156 See infra notes 157–165 and accompanying text. 
157 The EPA does not appear to maintain previous NCP Product Schedules online. 
158 Toxicity is gauged by the parts per million of dispersant, when mixed with oil at a 
1:10 ratio, that kills 50 percent of a given species within an allotted time period. See Nation-
al Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, Envtl. Prot. Agen-
cy, http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/national-contingency-plan-product-
schedule-toxicity-and-effectiveness-summaries (last visited Jan 5, 2014), available at http:// 
perma.cc/Q6GN-LDSC. 
159 No. 2 fuel oil is distinct from Louisiana sweet crude, which was the actual oil leak-
ing from the Macondo Well. Different types of oil have different reactions with dispersants. 
See id. 
160 Americamysis bahia (Mysidopsis bahia), MBL Aquaculture, http://www.mblaqua 
culture.com/content/organisms/americamysis_bahia.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), available 
at http://www.perma.cc/0kKV1KYitCz. 
82 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:63 
dispersants.161 For the dispersant alone, Corexit 9500A is the eleventh 
most toxic and Corexit 9527A is the ninth most toxic.162 For the My-
sidopsis, Corexit 9500A mixed with No. 2 Fuel Oil is the thirteenth 
most toxic of twenty-three listed dispersants, while Corexit 9527 mixed 
with No. 2 Fuel Oil is  the sixteenth most toxic.163 For the dispersant 
alone, Corexit 9500A is the sixteenth most toxic while Corexit 9527A is 
the fourteenth most toxic.164 In terms of effectiveness, Corexit 
EC9500A and Corexit EC9527A have the second and fourth lowest ef-
fectiveness percentages on average at 50.00 and 50.40 percent, respec-
tively.165 
3. EPA Directive and BP Response 
 In response to the public outcry over the use of Corexit, on May 
20, 2010, the EPA directed BP to identify a dispersant less toxic than 
Corexit within twenty-four hours, and then to begin using this newly-
identified dispersant within the subsequent seventy-two hours.166 BP 
quickly responded that there were no superior viable alternatives to 
Corexit.167 While BP acknowledged that there were five other accepta-
ble alternatives with advantages in effectiveness and toxicity, BP argued 
that knowledge gaps made them unreliable alternatives to Corexit.168 
BP also claimed that Corexit 9500 “appears to have fewer long term 
                                                                                                                      
161 National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, supra 
note 158. The Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries have been updated 
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intellectually-dishonest/, available at http://perma.cc/F9XY-JEAN; see also EPA’s Toxicity 
Testing of Dispersants, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-
testing.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013), available at http://www.perma.cc/0VBfxSSyBXq. 
162 National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, supra 
note 158. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive—
Addendum 1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/directive-
addendum2.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0hLDJzhDBL5. 
167 Letter From Douglas J. Suttles, BP, to Rear Admiral Mary Landry, Coast Guard, and 
Samuel Coleman, EPA (May 20, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ 
dispersants/5-21bp-response.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/07FV3s2fKsb. 
168 While BP asserted that one such dispersant might have endocrine disruption ef-
fects, the manufacturer had not conducted tests to confirm this possibility. Id. at 2. 
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effects than the other dispersants evaluated,”169 despite the absence of 
reliable science to support such a claim.170 Finally, BP argued that 
Corexit and Sea Brat #4 were the only dispersants that BP possessed in 
quantities sufficient to be useful in cleanup efforts, and that Corexit 
was the superior of the two.171 BP did not seem to consider the option 
of ceasing all dispersant use despite tests showing that oil alone might 
be less toxic than the combined toxicity of the oil mixed with Corex-
it.172 
4. Subsequent EPA Testing 
 While BP continued to use Corexit for the remainder of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the EPA performed further tests on the 
effectiveness and toxicity of Corexit in a more robust and site-specific 
manner than any previous tests, including those submitted by Nalco, 
Corexit’s manufacturer, per Subpart J of the NCP.173 A July 2010 report 
from the EPA discussed the testing of eight dispersants with the specific 
type of oil that was leaking from the Macondo wellhead—Louisiana 
sweet crude.174 The EPA also tested for endocrine disruption and con-
                                                                                                                      
169 See id. at 9. The manufacturer’s tests were also conducted by different laboratories 
and on dispersants mixed with No. 2 fuel oil, not Louisiana sweet crude. See Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Dispersants Toxicity Testing—Phase II: Questions and Answers 4 (Aug. 2, 
2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/BPSpill/dispersants/qanda-phase2.pdf and http:// 
www.perma.cc/0bp53STTQi6. 
170 See, e.g., Letter from Lisa Jackson, EPA, to David Rainey, BP (May 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/Rainey-letter-052610.pdf and http://perma.cc/ 
L9NV-DZDN (describing BP’s failure to provide data on why Corexit was the best choice 
among dispersants). 
171 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 3, at 9. There is some doubt regarding the claim that other manufacturers 
could not provide sufficient amounts of dispersants. For example, the manufacturer of 
Dispersit issued a statement that it could immediately produce 20,000 gallons—and even-
tually 60,000 gallons—of Dispersit a day. EPA: BP Must Use Less Toxic Oil Dispersant; BP Re-
fuses Change and Continues Corexit Use, Before It’s News (May 23, 2010), http:// 
beforeitsnews.com/environment/2010/05/epa-bp-must-use-less-toxic-oil-dispersant-bp-
refuses-change-and-continues-corexit-use-48203.html, available at http://perma.cc/0eNHU 
36vUpG. By comparison, BP had more than 246,000 gallons of Corexit, and Nalco had 
68,000 more gallons available. Id. 
172 The EPA’s tests concluded that the oil alone was less toxic to certain marine species 
than the combined toxicity of the oil mixed with certain dispersants. Envtl. Prot. Agen-
cy, supra note 41. 
173 Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 36, at 13 (results from toxicity testing of Corexit 
9500 on No. 2 fuel oil but not Louisiana sweet crude); Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 
41, at 2, 8. 
174 See generally Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 1 (outlining the study’s methodology 
and findings). Different reports have used slightly different names and capitalizations for 
the oil that leaked from the Macondo wellhead, including South Louisiana sweet crude oil, 
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cluded that none of eight dispersants showed signs of significant endo-
crine disruption properties.175 The EPA did, however, limit testing to 
the same two species ordinarily tested by dispersant manufacturers for 
dispersants to be listed on the NCP Product Schedule, rather than test-
ing the dispersants on a wider variety of species.176 
 The EPA’s tests concluded that Corexit 9527 was “generally no 
more toxic” than other dispersants when mixed with Louisiana sweet 
crude, and that Corexit 9500 was “generally no more toxic to aquatic 
test species than oil alone.”177 Notably, the EPA also concluded that 
Louisiana sweet crude becomes less toxic when mixed with Corexit 
9500, which was contrary to all previous findings.178 Overall, the EPA 
found that Corexit was “generally no more toxic” for use in the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill than alternative dispersants.179 
III. Analysis of UNCLOS and the NCP Dispersant Legal Regime 
 This part examines several articles of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in relation to the duty to protect 
the marine environment and concludes that the United States failed to 
regulate dispersants effectively and thus fell short of the standards es-
tablished by UNCLOS.180 First, this part determines that the provisions 
regarding the marine environment contained in Part XII of UNCLOS 
are customary international law, and thus the United States should ob-
serve them.181 Second, this part discusses Article 192 of UNCLOS, 
which is foundational to the interpretation of other articles in Part XII 
of UNCLOS.182 Third, this part discusses two different UNCLOS arti-
cles—Article 194 and Article 195—and determines that the United 
States fell short of the standards represented by both articles due to an 
                                                                                                                      
Louisiana sweet crude, South Louisiana crude oil, and Light Louisiana oil. See, e.g., id. at 2; 
National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, supra note 158. 
175 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 169 (stating that “[n]one of the eight disper-
sants tested displayed biologically significant endocrine disrupting activity,” with limited 
exceptions). 
176 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 3, at 10. 
177 Questions and Answers on Dispersants, supra note 44. 
178 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 1, at 12–13 (showing a greater toxicity of a 
Louisiana sweet crude alone than when combined with Corexit 9500). 
179 See Questions and Answers on Dispersants, supra note 44; see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, supra note 1, at 13. 
180 Infra notes 185–389 and accompanying text. 
181 Infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
182 Infra notes 221–230 and accompanying text. 
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insufficient legal and regulatory scheme as applied to dispersants.183 
Several recommendations follow for how the United States can meet 
the standards represented by Article 194 and Article 195 of UN-
CLOS.184 
A. UNCLOS Is Customary International Law for the United States 
 The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.185 Nevertheless, the 
United States, like most other nations, considers most of UNCLOS to 
reflect customary international law,186 including Article 192, Article 
194, and Article 195.187 One definition of customary international law 
is “the general and consistent practices of [S]tates that they follow from 
a sense of legal obligation.”188 Customary international law is widely 
recognized as a binding primary source of international law.189 Two 
elements of customary international law exist: (1) state practice and (2) 
opinio juris.190 The United States meets both of these elements for the 
international laws reflected by UNCLOS Article 192, Article 194, and 
Article 195.191 Therefore, the United States should comply with Article 
192, Article 194, and Article 195 of UNCLOS.192 
1. State Practice 
 State practice may be defined as “any act or statement by a state,” 
including “any physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto (such as 
General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and 
                                                                                                                      
183 Infra notes 231–295, 300–308, 317–342, 353–384 and accompanying text. 
184 Infra notes 296–299, 309–314, 343–352, 385–389 and accompanying text. 
185 United Nations, supra note 9, at 8. 
186 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
187 Philippe Sands & Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmen-
tal Law 350 (2012). 
188 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 23 
(2003). 
189 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b); see also Jack L. Gold-
smith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law 1 ( John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 63, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=145972; William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: 
Some Lessons from History, 120 Yale L.J. Online 169, 169–92 (2010), http://yale 
lawjournal.org/images/pdfs/920.pdf, available at http://perma.cc/0xDCvE7YcHD (de-
scribing the binding nature of customary international law). 
190 Customary IHL, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin (last visited Jan. 4, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/ 
EZ39-SW3E. 
191 Infra notes 193–209 and accompanying text. 
192 Infra notes 211–214 and accompanying text. 
86 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:63 
omissions.”193 Duration and uniformity of a practice are also considera-
tions for a state practice.194 Several sources indicate that the United 
States abides by the provisions of UNCLOS such that America meets 
the element of state practice.195 The simplest and strongest evidence of 
state practice is President Ronald Reagan’s unambiguous 1983 directive 
that instructed all federal agencies to abide by UNCLOS, with the ex-
ception of Part XI.196 Part XII of UNCLOS, which includes Articles 192, 
194, and 195, was included in President Reagan’s directive.197 No U.S. 
president since Reagan has altered his position, and several presidents 
have reaffirmed the U.S. government’s commitment to following the 
terms of UNCLOS.198 Therefore, Part XII of UNCLOS almost certainly 
meets the element of state practice.199 
                                                                                                                      
193 J. Craig Barker, International Law and International Relations 55–58 (2000). 
194 Id. 
195 See, e.g., Steven Groves, The Law of the Sea: Costs of U.S. Accession to UNCLOS, Herit-
age Foundation ( June 14, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2012/ 
06/the-law-of-the-sea-convention-treaty-doc-103-39, available at http://perma.cc/0XVp 
JNZvZ96 (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the Unit-
ed States, vol. 2, at 5 (1987)) (“[B]y express or tacit agreement accompanied by con-
sistent practice, the United States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive pro-
visions of the Convention, other than those addressing deep sea-bed mining, as statements 
of customary law binding upon them apart from the Convention.”); Current Status of the 
Convention of the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 103rd Cong. 35 (1994) (statement of D. James Baker that “UNCLOS will support 
NOAA’s role as a steward of the marine environment, because it sets forth the rights and 
obligations of States to protect and preserve the marine environment from all sources of 
marine pollution, including land-based sources, ocean dumping, atmospheric deposition, 
and vessel source pollution”), available at http://goo.gl/EyN0si and http://perma.cc/ 
TFT8-SMJL. 
196 Even Part XI of UNCLOS might now meet the requirement of state practice, 
though this idea is not essential to this Article’s analysis. Citizens for Global Solutions, 
The United States and the Law of the Sea 1, available at http://globalsolutions.org/ 
files/public/documents/LOS_Factsheet.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0gMn1ectdHE. 
197 See id. President Reagan evidently would not sign the treaty because of certain deep 
seabed mining provisions, which were distinct from provisions to protect the marine envi-
ronment. See Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Ocean Policy, March 10, 1983, http:// 
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083c.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), 
available at http://perma.cc/0MKF5RqCjbF. 
198 For example, President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have pushed 
Congress to ratify UNCLOS. See Thomas Wright, Outlaw of the Sea: The Senate Republicans’ UN-
CLOS Blunder, Foreign Affairs (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
137815/thomas-wright/outlaw-of-the-sea, available at http://perma.cc/02cri3tNgU1 (discuss-
ing President George W. Bush’s support); The Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.S. Navy 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps, http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_law_ 
of_the_sea.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/06jsf8StUWR (quoting 
a statement from President Obama regarding UNCLOS as potentially beneficial for U.S. 
national security). 
199 Supra notes 193–198 and accompanying text. 
2014] Deepwater Horizon and the Law of the Sea 87 
2. Opinio Juris 
 Opinio Juris may be defined as “the belief that an act is legally nec-
essary,” or in other words, that a nation conducts a state practice out of 
a sense of legal obligation.200 Although resolutions in the United Na-
tions General Assembly and other non-binding agreements do not cre-
ate custom per se (because a nation’s government might not necessari-
ly feel bound by those agreements), such non-binding agreements can 
nevertheless evolve into opinio juris and thereby fulfill the second ele-
ment of customary international law.201 Evidence of opinio juris for Arti-
cles 192, 194, and 195 of UNCLOS can be found in 1972’s nonbinding 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.202 The Stockholm 
Declaration has been described as “complementary” to the marine pol-
lution provisions of UNCLOS III.203 The United States is a party to the 
Stockholm Declaration.204 Closely mirroring the duty to protect the 
marine environment that underlies Part XII of UNCLOS, Principle 6 of 
the Stockholm Declaration states the following: 
The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and 
the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to 
exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harm-
less, must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irre-
versible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems.205 
 Further evidence of opinio juris regarding Articles 192, 194, and 
195 of UNCLOS can be found in 1992’s Agenda 21, which is a non-
binding agreement that received global consensus.206 Not only does 
                                                                                                                      
200 Barker, supra note 193, at 60. 
201 Id. at 60–61. 
202 See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Principle 6, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, 11 I.L.M. 1416, available at http:// 
www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 and 
http://perma.cc/G9JQ-LJBD. 
203 See E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea: Volume I, Introductory 
Manual 337 (1994). 
204 Günther Handl, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
United Nations, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html (last visited Dec. 27, 
2013), available at http://perma.cc/5PT9-S2VJ. Note that the United States expressed 
opposition to some concepts unrelated to the ocean pollution provisions. 
205 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra 
note 202. 
206 See U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, Agenda 21, Aug. 12, 1992, 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf 
and http://www.perma.cc/06eDHnFoLmL; see also Report of the Global Conference on 
the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Annex II Preamble, Oct. 
1994, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 167/9, available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/ 
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Agenda 21 mirror most of the obligations to protect the marine envi-
ronment that Part XII of UNCLOS embodies, but Agenda 21 also ex-
plicitly indicates that international law is “reflected in the provisions of 
[UNCLOS].”207 As a signatory to Agenda 21, the United States explicit-
ly signed an agreement that declares certain marine protection provi-
sions of UNCLOS to be international law, which is evidence of opinio 
juris.208 Finally, the United States has also stated that it would adopt 
“uniform international measures” to enforce the duty to protect the 
marine environment, which indicates that the U.S. government consid-
ers itself bound by such measures.209 Therefore, the United States 
meets the elements of state practice and opinio juris such that it should 
comply with customary international law embodied in Articles 192, 194, 
and 195 of UNCLOS.210 
B. The United States Should Enact Laws to Enforce UNCLOS 
 Although the United States has not acceded to UNCLOS, it should 
nonetheless strive to meet the customary international law standards 
represented by UNCLOS Articles 192, 194, and 195 by enacting appro-
priate domestic laws and regulations.211 Furthermore, many commen-
tators and observers argue that the United States should ratify UN-
CLOS for reasons related to environmental protection, economic 
interests, and national security.212 President George W. Bush and Presi-
dent Barack Obama have both supported Senate ratification of UN-
                                                                                                                      
sids_pdfs/BPOA.pdf and http://perma.cc/0qAsazuZhPw (describing Agenda 21 as a 
“global consensus”). 
207 U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, supra note 206, ¶ 17.1. 
208 Customary IHL, supra note 190. 
209 Bauerlein, supra note 8, at 901. 
210 See supra notes 200–209 and accompanying text. 
211 There is debate over whether and to what extent customary international law is self-
executing federal common law, so while Article XII of UNCLOS might be enforceable in 
the courts, the matter is unresolved. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., SOSA, Customary Inter-
national Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 870–71 (2007). 
212  See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Should the United States Ratify the UN Law of the Sea?, 
Council on Foreign Rel., http://www.cfr.org/treaties-and-agreements/should-united-
states-ratify-un-law-sea/p31828 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/ 
RM7R-BMWX (arguing that the United States should ratify UNCLOS because doing so 
would provide several benefits, and citing the support of the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations); Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law 
of the Sea Treaty, Atlantic ( June 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258 
301, available at http://perma.cc/G869-9S4R (discussing how former Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey expressed support for ratifying UNCLOS). 
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CLOS for the numerous benefits that joining the convention would 
provide to the United States.213 Although there is debate regarding the 
extent UNCLOS to which imposes binding legal obligations upon the 
United States, the United States should ratify the treaty and abide by its 
provisions in the interim.214 
C. Part XII of UNCLOS 
 This section first discusses Article 192 of UNCLOS, which states 
the basic purpose of Part XII of UNCLOS: the duty of States “to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.”215 Next, this section deter-
mines that the United States failed to act in observance of the ordinary 
meaning of Article 194 of UNCLOS because the use of oil dispersants, 
as authorized under U.S. laws and regulations, constitutes “pollution of 
the marine environment.”216 Because the language of a treaty should 
be interpreted consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty,217 
this section further concludes that the United States would be observing 
Article 194 if its laws and regulations could ensure that oil dispersants 
are used only if they have a net environmental benefit on the marine 
environment, and if they are the optimal dispersant to be used in any 
given oil spill.218 This section then recommends a series of legal re-
forms that would help the United States to ensure observance of UN-
CLOS Article 194.219 Finally, this section determines that the United 
States failed to observe Article 195 of UNCLOS because the use of oil 
dispersants, as authorized under U.S. laws and regulations, (1) transfers 
oil damage from one place to another and (2) transforms pollution 
from one type into another.220 
                                                                                                                      
213 See Bellinger, supra note 212. 
214 See id.; Patrick, supra note 212. 
215 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982, avail-
able at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/9SV3-AV97; infra notes 221–230 and accompanying text. 
216 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 194; infra 
notes 231–269 and accompanying text. 
217 “The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their con-
text. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining 
the meaning of its provisions.” Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
¶ 12, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), available at http://goo.gl/ykn0kz. In other words, 
“the treaty’s ‘object and purpose’ is to be referred to in determining the meaning of the 
‘terms of the treaty’ and not as an independent basis for interpretation.” Id. 
218 Infra notes 259–268 and accompanying text. 
219 Infra notes 296–299, 309–314, 343–352 and accompanying text. 
220 Infra notes 353–384 and accompanying text. 
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1. Article 192—Obligation to Protect and Preserve the Marine 
Environment 
 Article 192 of UNCLOS provides the foundational obligation for 
Part XII of UNCLOS.221 Part XII of UNCLOS is the preeminent codifi-
cation of customary international law related to the protection of the 
marine environment, which is why it was once described by the United 
Nations Office of Ocean Affairs as “constitutional in nature” and “the 
first comprehensive statement of international law on [the marine en-
vironment].”222 As the backbone of Part XII, Article 192 declares, 
“States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine envi-
ronment.”223 Because the object and purpose of a treaty should be con-
sidered when interpreting the treaty’s text,224 Article 192 should be 
used when interpreting the remainder of Part  XII of UNCLOS.225 
 First, an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of Article 192 is 
necessary.226 In making such an interpretation, the word “have” in the 
phrase “have the obligation” indicates a mandatory legal obligation; 
that is, a country must protect and preserve the marine environment.227 
Furthermore, Article 192’s duty to “protect” the marine environment 
should mean “abstaining from harmful activities and taking affirmative 
measures to ensure that environmental deterioration does not oc-
cur.”228 When this underlying purpose of UNCLOS is read into other 
provisions of the treaty, it is reasonable to conclude that the United 
States, in some circumstances, should pass and enforce laws and regula-
tions such that cleanup responses to oil spills result in a net environmen-
tal benefit, which would ensure that further environmental deterioration 
does not occur as a result of cleanup efforts.229 A net environmental 
                                                                                                                      
221 Infra notes 222–225 and accompanying text. 
222 The Law of the Sea Inst., Sustainable Development and Preservation of the 
Oceans: The Challenges of UNCLOS and Agenda 21, at 23–24 (Mochtar Kusuma-
Atmadja et al. eds., 1995). 
223 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 192. 
224 Appellate Body Report, supra note 217, ¶ 21. 
225 Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch, The Environmental Consequences of War: 
Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives 207 (2000) (describing how Article 192 
frames the overall purpose of Part XII of UNCLOS). 
226 According to the Vienna Convention, which is customary international law, the 
provisions of a treaty should receive their ordinary meaning in their context. Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
227 See id. art. 31(1). 
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benefit is an increase in environmental or ecological properties that is 
larger than the corresponding decrease in environmental or ecological 
properties caused by the same action.230 
2. Article 194—Measures to Prevent, Reduce, and Control Pollution of 
the Marine Environment 
 First, this subsection analyzes Article 194 of UNCLOS and deter-
mines that the United States’s use of Corexit dispersants in response to 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill appears to fall short of the duty to use 
“all measures . . . necessary” to prevent, reduce, and control “pollution 
of the marine environment” within the plain meaning of Article 194.231 
Next, this subsection concludes that the United States would be in ob-
servance of Article 194 if it were to enact and enforce laws and regula-
tions that allow the use of dispersants only if the use results in a net en-
vironmental benefit and the dispersants are the optimal dispersants for 
a particular oil spill.232 
i. “Any Sources” of Pollution Includes Airplanes, Spraying Mechanisms Aboard 
Vessels, and Pipes from Vessels 
 First, the methods by which dispersants were dispensed—including 
by airplane, spraying mechanisms aboard vessels, and a pipe going un-
derwater from a vessel—are within the scope of Article 194 because 
they fall within the meaning of “any source.”233 Interpreted according 
to the text’s ordinary meaning,234 “any” can be defined as “whatever or 
                                                                                                                      
that pollutes the ocean is an unreasonable interpretation. For example, excess CO2 has a 
negative impact on the oceans, but UNCLOS would not mandate shutting down the entire 
carbon economy. See, e.g., Intl. Union for Conservation of Nature, The State of the 
Ocean 2013: Perils, Prognoses and Proposals 3–6 (2013), available at http://www.state 
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230 Net Environmental Benefit Analysis, Envtl. Sci. Division of Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., 
http://www.esd.ornl.gov/programs/ecorisk/net_environmental.html (last visited Jan. 5, 
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231 Infra notes 233–258 and accompanying text. 
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233 See infra notes 234–242 and accompanying text. 
234 See Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 31. 
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whichever it may be.”235 Furthermore, “source” can be defined as “any 
thing or place from which something comes, arises, or is obtained.”236 
These definitions demonstrate that the plain meaning of “any source” 
is extremely broad and, by the ordinary meaning of the phrase, would 
include essentially anything that produces pollution.237 Therefore, air-
planes, spraying mechanisms aboard vessels, and a pipe going under-
water from a vessel are almost certainly “any sources” within the mean-
ing of Article 194 of UNCLOS.238 
 Even if the plain meaning of “any source” is not entirely clear—for 
example, “source” could arguably have a unique meaning specific to 
marine pollution—the draft history239 of UNCLOS confirms the broad 
scope intended to apply to the phrase “any source.”240 According to a 
1973 draft article from Working Group 2 of Sub-Committee III of the 
Sea-Bed Committee, Article 194 “shall deal with all sources of pollution 
of the marine environment, whether land, marine, or any other 
sources, including rivers, estuaries, the atmosphere, pipelines, outfall 
structures, vessels, aircraft and sea-bed installations or devices.”241 Be-
cause vessels, aircraft, and pipelines were explicitly considered in the 
drafting of UNCLOS, all of the methods by which Corexit was dis-
persed into the Gulf of Mexico during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
should qualify as “any sources” under Article 195 of UNCLOS.242 
                                                                                                                      
235 Any, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/any (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.perma.cc/04JBVQCBYcP. 
236 Jeff Weinrach, Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization: Back to Basics, in Hand-
book of Pollution Control and Waste Minimization 1 (Abbas Ghassemi ed., 2001). 
237 See Protecting and Preserving Marine Biodiversity, Including Through Sustainable Fisheries, 
in Training Manual on International Environmental Law 225 (Lal Kurukulasuriya & 
Nicholas A. Robinson eds., 2006) (describing examples of sources such as “pollution by 
ships through dumping and operational discharges, from land (through rivers) or from 
the exploitation of the non-living resources on the sea-bed”). 
238 Supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text. 
239 The Vienna Convention indicates that a treaty’s preparatory work may serve as a 
supplementary means of interpretation when the meaning of a term is ambiguous. See 
Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 32. 
240 Center for Oceans Law and Policy, United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 56 (vol. IV, 1990). 
241 Id. 
242 See supra notes 234, 240 and accompanying text. 
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ii. The Use of Dispersants Is Likely “Pollution of the Marine Environment” by 
Its Ordinary Meaning 
 The use of dispersants likely constitutes “pollution of the marine 
environment” within the meaning of UNCLOS.243 UNCLOS specifically 
defines “pollution of the marine environment” as follows: 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances 
or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to 
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hin-
drance to marine activities, including fishing and other legit-
imate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea wa-
ter and reduction of amenities . . . .244 
 The ordinary meaning of “pollution of the marine environment” 
considering the object and purpose of UNCLOS can clarify this 
phrase’s meaning.245 “Deleterious” can be defined as “harmful to 
health or well-being.”246 For example, Corexit (like most other disper-
sants) is toxic,247 which generally means that it “can cause harmful ef-
fects to living organisms,”248 or that it exceeds an acceptable concentra-
tion of contaminants.249 Furthermore, Corexit has been shown to be 
carcinogenic to some living creatures.250 Therefore, the use of disper-
                                                                                                                      
243 Article 194 contemplates pollution of the “marine environment.” Although the 
“marine environment” is not specifically defined in UNCLOS, evidence from Article 1 of a 
proposal during UNLOS’s drafting stages brings clarity to its meaning: “The marine envi-
ronment comprises the surface of the sea, the air space above, the water column and the 
sea-bed beyond the high tide mark including the biosystems therein or dependent there-
on.” Center for Oceans Law and Policy, supra note 240, at 42. Therefore, the area to 
which dispersants were deployed—the surface and subsurface of the ocean—are both part 
of the “marine environment.” See id. 
244 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 1(4) (em-
phasis added). 
245 See Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 31. 
246 Webster’s New World College Dictionary 382 (4th ed. 2008). 
247 For example, the EPA’s testing of Corexit after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
showed that for Mysid Shrimp (Americamysis bahia) over 48 hours, a mixture of Corexit 
9500A and South Louisiana sweet crude oil had an LC50 toxicity of 5.4 (ppm)3, and for 
Inland Silverside (Menidia beryllina) over 96 hours, an LC50 toxicity of 7.6 (ppm)3. See En-
vtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 1, at 13. 
248 See Glossary of Terms, Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, http:// 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/glossary.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.perma.cc/ 
07SFYsWg3kn. 
249 See Pollution Prevention Definitions, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/p2/ 
pubs/p2policy/definitions.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.perma. 
cc/0n39Gan84Up. 
250 Biello, supra note 56. 
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sants, such as Corexit, with toxic properties is “pollution of the marine 
environment.”251 
 In addition to ordinary meaning, evidence of the broad scope of 
Article 194(3)(a) supports the conclusion that the use of dispersants is 
“pollution of the marine environment.”252 According to Article 
194(3)(a), States have an affirmative obligation to “prevent, reduce, 
and control pollution of the marine environment” from “all sources of 
pollution.”253 Originally, the language of Article 194(3)(a) included 
substances that are “toxic and harmful.”254 This language, however, was 
changed to include substances that are “toxic, harmful, or noxious.”255 
Unlike the original provision, which likely used the conjunction “and” 
to indicate that a substance must be both toxic as well as harmful, the 
modified provision’s use of the conjunction “or” means that “pollution 
of the marine environment” covers a broader range of substances— 
those that are toxic but not harmful, or harmful but not noxious, for ex-
ample.256 Even if Corexit is determined not to be “harmful” per se, 
Corexit is undisputedly “toxic” within the ordinary meaning of the 
word.257 Therefore, the use of dispersants with toxic properties, such as 
Corexit, constitutes “pollution of the marine environment.”258 
iii. The Use of Dispersants Abides by Article 194 if Scientifically Determined to 
Result in a Net Environmental Benefit 
 As established above, the object and purpose of UNCLOS— re-
flected in Article 192 as a State’s “obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment” —can be used to interpret Article 194.259 Article 
194’s obligation to use the “best practicable means” to prevent, reduce, 
and control “pollution of the marine environment” may be interpreted 
                                                                                                                      
251 Supra notes 243–250 and accompanying text. 
252 Supra notes 243–251, 253–258 and accompanying text. 
253 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 194(1), 
(3). 
254 See Center for Oceans Law and Policy, supra note 240, at 66. 
255 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 194(3)(a) 
(emphasis added). 
256 The word “and” is generally used in the conjunctive, while the word “or” is general-
ly used in the disjunctive. See Katharine Clark et al., A Guide to Reading, Interpret-
ing, and Applying Statutes 11 n.34 (2006) (citing William N. Eskridge et al., Cases 
and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 827 
(2001)). In some circumstances, however, “or” can mean “A or B or both.” Id. at 11 n.36. 
257 See, e.g., Campbell Robertson & Elisabeth Rosenthal, Agency Orders Use of a Less Toxic 
Chemical in the Gulf, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2010, at A15. 
258 Supra notes 243–257 and accompanying text. 
259 Supra notes 222–225 and accompanying text. 
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to ensure that all such activities result in a net environmental benefit.260 
Although this interpretation of Article 194 would permit the “pollution 
of the marine environment” via toxic dispersants by its ordinary mean-
ing (for example, if a toxic substance pollutes the marine environment 
but counteracts another toxic substance), the gain in environmental 
quality must outweigh the environmental injuries in accordance with 
the object and purpose of UNCLOS.261 This interpretation can also be 
harmonized with the definition of “deleterious” —namely harm to liv-
ing resources and marine life—because “deleterious” can be interpret-
ed to mean harmful to health or well-being as a whole, not just on an 
individual level.262 
 Interpreting Article 194 as applying to all pollution regardless of 
the net environmental outcome would lead to absurd or unreasonable 
results. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, supplemen-
tary means of treaty interpretation can be used to determine when one 
interpretation “leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unrea-
sonable.”263 It is unreasonable to conclude that Article 194’s duty to 
prevent “pollution of the marine environment” is breached if, for ex-
ample, the use of a small amount of a toxic substance eradicates mil-
lions of gallons of toxic sludge.264 
 In addition to only authorizing dispersant use that results in a net 
environmental benefit, Article 194 likely requires a dispersant to also 
result in the optimal net environmental benefit, as compared to other 
available dispersants. Article 194 of UNCLOS requires that a State must 
take “all measures . . . necessary” using the “best practicable means” to 
prevent, reduce, and control “pollution of the marine environment.”265 
The ordinary meaning of the word best— “in or to the highest de-
                                                                                                                      
260 Use of the word “reduce” supports the proposition that Article 194 permits 
measures that result in a net environmental, benefit because such measures would reduce 
the total amount of pollution. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra 
note 215, art. 194(1). 
261 See supra note 230 and accompanying text (definition of net environmental benefit). 
262 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 1(4) 
(definition of “pollution of the marine environment”); Webster’s New World College 
Dictionary, supra note 246, at 382. 
263 See Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 32(b). 
264 The object and purpose of a treaty is often used to help determine whether a cer-
tain interpretation is unreasonable. Oliver Dörr, Interpretation of Treaties, in Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 584 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalen-
bach eds., 2011). Here, the object and purpose of Article 192 is to “protect and preserve 
the marine environment,” which would seem to permit using a small amount of pollution 
to remedy a large amount of pollution. 
265 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 194. 
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gree”266—indicates that a State should enact and enforce laws and regu-
lations ensuring that only the dispersant with the greatest net environ-
mental benefit is used in response to oil spills. Although the use of the 
word “practicable” and the phrase “in accordance with their capabili-
ties” might seem to diminish the obligation to use the “best” means 
available, this language was inserted for developing countries,267 which 
are held to lesser standards under Article 194 than developed coun-
tries—a caveat that is fairly commonplace in international environmen-
tal laws.268 Therefore, nations should only use dispersants if they result 
in an optimal net environmental benefit such that (1) a net environ-
mental benefit is achieved and (2) the dispersant used has a less harm-
ful effect on the marine environment than other alternatives.269 
iv. The United States Did Not Observe Article 194 of UNCLOS 
 Article 194’s obligation to use all means necessary to prevent, re-
duce, and control pollution of the marine environment can be inter-
preted as an obligation to enact and enforce laws and regulations such 
that dispersants that cause “pollution of the marine environment” are 
used only if they result in a net environmental benefit and are the op-
timal dispersants.270 Although dispersants may in some circumstances 
result in a net environmental benefit, the United States—through en-
acting and enforcing laws and regulations—has not used the “best prac-
ticable means at [its] disposal” to ensure that dispersants used in re-
sponse to oil spills result in a net environmental benefit, let alone an 
optimal net environmental benefit.271 Therefore, the United States did 
                                                                                                                      
266 Best, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/best (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.perma.cc/09J8Wo4KVrM. 
267 Jon M. Van Dyke, Allocating Fish Across Jurisdictions, in Law of the Sea, Environ-
mental Law and Settlement of Disputes 24 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum 
eds., 2007), available at http://www.fishallocation.com/papers/pdf/papers/JonVanDyke. 
pdf and http://perma.cc/07ZuXNavYae. 
268 See Rudiger Wolfrum et al., Conflicts in International Law 37 (2003). Ex-
amples of other international environmental treaties with lesser standards for developing 
countries are the Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol. See Mary J. Bortscheller, Equi-
table but Ineffective: How the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles the 
Global Fight Against Climate Change, 10 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 49, 50 (2010). 
269 Supra notes 259–268 and accompanying text. 
270 Supra notes 259–268 and accompanying text. 
271 See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, supra note 3, at 270–71 (concluding that the federal government did not ade-
quately prepare for the use of dispersants in a large oil spill and had insufficient infor-
mation about the effects of dispersants). 
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not observe customary international law as reflected in Article 194 of 
UNCLOS. 
 Further below, this section makes recommendations for how the 
United States can comply with Article 194 of UNCLOS.272 The presi-
dent has allocated the power to amend the NCP to the EPA, and there-
fore the EPA is the appropriate governmental body to effectuate this 
section’s recommendations.273 A preferable alternative, however, would 
be for Congress to pass laws to reform dispersant regulation so that the 
EPA has less discretion to deviate from optimal dispersant use.274 
v. The United States Approved Corexit for Use Despite Less-Toxic Alternatives 
 The United States’s failure to mandate that BP use the least toxic, 
most effective dispersant available was in conflict with the customary 
international law reflected by Article 194 of UNCLOS. In general, data 
shows that the use of dispersants on oil spills results in a fairly unpre-
dictable “net toxicity,” or the total toxicity of the oil and the disper-
sant.275 For example, assuming that “1” equals one unit of toxicity, the 
toxicity of a mixture of oil and dispersants can result in a variety of net 
toxicity outcomes:276 
L = Leaked Oil; D = Dispersant 
  Outcome 1: Dispersants result in a net reduction in total tox-
icity (1 L + 1 D = .5 L + D). 
  Outcome 2: Dispersants result in no change in total toxicity (1 
L + 1 D = 1 L + D). 
  Outcome 3: Dispersants result in an increase in total toxicity 
less than the sum of the oil and the dispersant (1 L + 1 D = 1.5 
L + D). 
                                                                                                                      
272 Infra notes 309–314, 343–352 and accompanying text. 
273 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2006) (conferring statutory authority on the president); Exec. 
Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1987), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 
codification/executive-order/12580.html and http://perma.cc/XP5-L8YX. 
274 Bills introduced to increase the regulation of dispersants were introduced in 2010 
but died. See Safe Dispersants Act, S. 3661, 111th Cong. (2010); Better Oil Spill Response 
Plan Act, H.R. 5608, 111th Cong. (2010). 
275 See Richard Denison, New EPA Data: Dispersant Likely Not Increasing Acute Lethality of 
Oil in BP Oil Disaster, Envtl. Defense Fund (Aug. 2, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/ 
nanotechnology/2010/08/02/new-epa-data-dispersant-likely-not-increasing-acute-lethality-
of-oil-in-bp-oil-disaster/, available at http://www.perma.cc/0ZcR4nXoDWh. 
276 These calculations are the author’s work and are not an official gauge for toxicity. 
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  Outcome 4: Dispersants result in an increase in toxicity equal 
to or greater than the combined toxicity of the oil and the 
dispersant (1 L + 1 D = 2 L + D).277 
 The only outcome listed above that results in a net environmental 
benefit, at least in terms of toxicity, is “Outcome 1,” where the net tox-
icity of the oil and dispersant is less than the oil alone. Many of the dis-
persants listed in the NCP Product Schedule, however, as well as those 
pre-authorized by the RRTs in Federal Region IV and Federal Region 
VI, have a net toxicity that is greater than the toxicity of the oil alone.278 
According to oil dispersant testing per the requirements of Subpart J, 
Corexit 9500 falls into Outcome 4 above: While Corexit alone has an 
LC50 (i.e. the concentration of a substance that kills 50 percent of a 
test organism, with higher values being less toxic279) of 25.2 on Menidia 
fish, and No. 2 fuel oil280 alone has an LC50 of 10.7, Corexit com-
bined281 with No. 2 fuel oil has an LC50 of 2.6, which is approximately 
4.1 times greater toxicity the No. 2 fuel oil by itself.282 Similarly, when a 
mixture of Corexit and No. 2 fuel oil was tested on a Mysidopsis,283 the 
resultant toxicity was 4.7 times greater than the No. 2 fuel oil alone.284 
On the other hand, several types of dispersants listed on the NCP 
Product Schedule resulted in a significantly decreased net toxicity when 
mixed with No. 2 fuel oil.285 Although other factors besides toxicity 
might weigh toward determining that dispersants resulted in a net envi-
ronmental benefit—for example, the wetlands that were spared from 
                                                                                                                      
277 Outcome 4 may be characterized as a synergistic outcome. “Synergy is strictly de-
fined as occurring if the effect of the combined exposure is greater than the sum of the 
effects of the two or more individual components of the mixture . . . .” Joe L. Mauderly & 
Jonathan M. Samet, Is There Evidence for Synergy Among Air Pollutants in Causing Health Ef-
fects?, 117(1) Envtl. Health Persp. 1, 1 (2009). 
278 See National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, su-
pra note 158. 
279 See 40 C.F.R. § 797.1950(a)(5) (1994). 
280 No. 2 fuel oil is the typical oil used in industry tests of dispersant toxicity per Sub-
part J of the NCP. See, e.g., Corexit EC9500A, Technical Product Bulletin #D-4, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ncp/products/corex950.htm (last updated 
Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/D7UC-Z4HC. 
281 The testing of dispersants uses a ratio of one part dispersant for ten parts oil under 
the EPA’s testing requirements. 40 C.F.R. 300 app. C (2013). 
282 Denison, supra note 275. 
283 Mysidopsis, a type of shrimp, is one of two species on which dispersants are typically 
tested. EPA’s Toxicity Testing of Dispersants, supra note 161. 
284 Denison, supra note 275. 
285 See National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, su-
pra note 158. 
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greater oil damage should be weighed into the equation286—the Unit-
ed States still failed to enact and enforce laws such that it employed the 
“best possible means at [its] disposal” to prevent, reduce, and control 
“pollution of the marine environment.” Doing so would require the 
United States to mandate the use of the optimal dispersant.287 
 During the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, one barrier to using dis-
persants superior to Corexit was that several less toxic, more effective 
dispersants were not readily available in sufficient supply.288 Some oil 
spill experts claim that the oil industry keeps only one type of disper-
sant on hand at a time, which effectively made Corexit the only viable 
option during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.289 If a particular brand 
of dispersant is required to achieve an optimal environmental benefit 
during an oil spill, but laws and regulations do not ensure its use, then 
a nation is not satisfying its obligation to take all measures necessary to 
prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment un-
der UNCLOS as customary international law.290 
 Finally, although EPA tests later showed that Corexit did in fact re-
sult a net reduction in total toxicity (Option 1 above), the United States 
still failed to observe UNCLOS Article 194 because the United States’s 
laws and regulations do not ensure that dispersants will be used only if 
they result in an optimal net environmental benefit. The EPA’s toxicity 
tests (released after the Macondo wellhead was capped) revealed that 
Corexit 9500, as applied to Louisiana sweet crude (rather than the No. 
2 fuel oil used for the toxicity testing required by Subpart J of the 
NCP), results in a mixture that is at least two times less toxic than the 
                                                                                                                      
286 See, e.g., Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 39. 
287 Supra notes 265–269 and accompanying text. 
288 Margot Roosevelt & Carolyn Cole, BP Refuses EPA Order to Switch to Less-Toxic Oil Dis-
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0FtAV4HtDYq. 
290 See Shima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 743, 763 
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ern Position, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495, 1497–98 (2011). 
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oil alone for tested species.291 In other words, Corexit 9500 resulted in a 
decreased net toxicity.292 This result, however, might have merely been a 
lucky outcome despite poor planning. Data that was readily available, 
both when Corexit was pre-authorized in Region IV and Region VI and 
when the FOSC approved its use, showed that Corexit significantly in-
creased the toxicity of some oil.293 Thus, the EPA’s tests could just as 
easily have shown that Corexit increases the toxicity of Louisiana sweet 
crude.294 A fortunate outcome despite a flawed legal and regulatory 
system does not mean that the United States used the “best possible 
means at [its] disposal” to enact and enforce laws and regulations that 
prevent, reduce, and control “pollution of the marine environment.” 
Therefore, the United States did not observe the standards established 
in Article 194 of UNCLOS.295 
vi. Recommendations for the United States’s Observance of UNCLOS 
 The United States should only authorize the use of dispersants in 
situations where the net toxicity of an oil and dispersant mixture is less 
than the toxicity of the oil alone.296 Furthermore, the United States 
should only permit the use of an optimal dispersant, namely a dispersant 
that is less toxic, more effective, and has a better environmental impact 
than any of the alternatives.297 One easy step that the United States 
could take to abide by UNCLOS Article 194 would be to make the 
EPA’s discretionary Design for the Environment program, which rec-
ognizes some dispersants as “as a safer oil spill treatment,” a mandatory 
requirement for a dispersant to be listed on Subpart J.298 
 Finally, oil drillers and transporters should be required to have a 
sufficient quantity of the optimum dispersant available for an oil spill 
based on the unique characteristics of the area in which they operate so 
that an inferior toxic dispersant does not cause unnecessary damage to 
                                                                                                                      
291 The LC50 for Corexit 9500A on Mysid Shrimp was 5.4 for the oil-dispersant mix-
ture, versus 2.7 for Louisiana sweet crude. The LC50 for Corexit 9500A on Inland Silver-
side for the oil-dispersant mixture was 7.6, versus 3.5 for Louisiana sweet crude. See Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, supra note 1, at 13. 
292 Id. 
293 Corexit EC9500A, Technical Product Bulletin #D-4, supra note 280. 
294 See id. 
295 Supra notes 291–294 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 259–264 and accompanying text. 
297 Supra notes 259–269 and accompanying text. 
298 NCP Product Schedule–Subpart J, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oem/ 
content/ncp (last updated Nov. 21, 2013), available at http://www.perma.cc/0Le4bERW 
cZj. 
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the marine environment.299 This was a major failure of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill that should be avoided in the future. 
vii. The United States Does Not Mandate Dispersant Testing During a Spill 
 Despite the toxicity of Corexit, as reflected in the initial tests per 
Subpart J, the United States’s laws and regulations permitted Corexit to 
be pre-authorized in Dispersant Use Plans in Federal Region IV and 
Federal Region VI.300 Although an FOSC still must approve the use of a 
dispersant that is pre-authorized, which some might consider a safe-
guard, in reality the FOSC approves the use of dispersants almost im-
mediately after an oil spill because dispersants are most effective when 
used within twenty-four hours of a spill.301 Therefore, there is very little 
time for additional testing after an oil spill is reported.302 
 Even if an FOSC approves the use of a dispersant before any test-
ing is done specific to the location of the spill, testing should still be 
conducted as soon as possible so that dispersant use can end if the dis-
persants are found to cause a negative net environmental impact.303 
During the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, even as thousands of gallons of 
Corexit were used every day, the U.S. government failed to mandate 
any additional testing of Corexit’s toxicity or effectiveness until at least 
May 20, 2011—an entire month after the spill began, and after more 
than 600,000 gallons of Corexit had been used.304 Even then, the Unit-
ed States stood idle as BP disregarded the EPA’s directive to find a less 
toxic dispersant than Corexit.305 Real-time testing was particularly im-
portant during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill because BP used disper-
sants at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, which was an unprecedented 
                                                                                                                      
299 Only one alternative to Corexit was available in adequate supply to use during the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See Roosevelt & Cole, supra note 288. Having more alterna-
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and novel technique for which there was no prior research.306 Overall, 
to abide by Article 194 of UNCLOS, the United States should have 
monitored dispersants that could potentially cause a net environmental 
harm, or dispersants for which there could be a superior alternative.307 
The U.S. government’s failure to do so demonstrates that the United 
States did not use all means necessary to prevent, reduce, and control 
pollution of the marine environment.308 
viii. Recommendations for the United States’s Observance of UNCLOS 
 Laws and regulations in the United States should require the im-
mediate and ongoing testing of dispersants after the FOSC approves 
their use.309 If tests show that there will not be a net environmental 
benefit from dispersant use, or that there is an alternative dispersant 
that results in a superior net environmental benefit, then the use of the 
approved dispersants should cease immediately.310 
 One way that the United States could improve dispersant monitor-
ing is through improvements to the Special Monitoring of Applied Re-
sponse Technology (SMART) program, which is a joint project of sev-
eral U.S. agencies that was implemented during the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.311 Through the SMART program, dispersants are 
monitored in three primary ways: visually, mechanically with tools such 
as a “fluorometer,” and analytically. 312 Toxicity testing, however, is not 
part of the SMART program, and special provisions for subsurface dis-
persant use are nonexistent.313 For these reasons, the Coast Guard’s 
ISPR Final Report recommends that the SMART program should con-
tinue to be enhanced.314 
                                                                                                                      
306 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 78, at 12, 22. 
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312 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 40. 
313 The EPA and Coast Guard authorized the use of subsurface dispersants after testing 
for toxicity and effectiveness, though there was little scientific information to perform 
these tests. Questions and Answers on Dispersants, supra note 44. 
314 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 45. 
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ix. The United States Lacks a Sufficient Testing Regime for Dispersants 
 In the United States, the testing regime for the safety of disper-
sants seems to fall far short of the standards represented by Article 194 
of UNCLOS.315 As described above, dispersants are listed on the NCP 
Product Schedule with minimal testing and are then pre-authorized in 
RCPs via Dispersant Use Plans without testing specific types of disper-
sants in combination with particular oil types and unique ecological 
conditions of a given area.316 The effectiveness and overall environ-
mental impact of dispersants has proven to fluctuate considerably by 
the application rate of the dispersant, type of oil, weather condition, 
water depth, water temperature, local species, and other variables.317 
The discrepancy in results between Nalco’s tests of Corexit that were 
submitted to the EPA (using No. 2 fuel oil and testing only for toxicity 
and effectiveness) and the EPA’s tests of Corexit on Louisiana sweet 
crude (performed after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill) highlights 
how unreliable generic toxicity and effectiveness tests are.318 For this 
reason, the National Research Council stated “there is no strong corre-
lation between laboratory and field tests.”319 
 Corexit, like other dispersants, has proven to have a variable effect 
in different conditions and on different species, though only a limited 
amount of data is available.320 One study showed that the toxicity of 
Corexit decreases with temperature, and that some fish and young an-
imals are more sensitive to the toxicity of Corexit than mollusks and 
adults, respectively.321 And ASTM International, a leader in establishing 
scientific and technical standards, asserts that the effectiveness322 of a 
                                                                                                                      
315 Infra notes 316–319 and accompanying text. 
316 Supra notes 87–99, 137–145 and accompanying text. 
317 See generally Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., Dispersant Application (2006), 
available at http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/star/23dispersants.pdf and http://perma. 
cc/G5GG-5JGH (discussing impacts of different application techniques and environmental 
conditions). 
318 See supra notes 157–165, 174–179 and accompanying text. 
319 Region IV Reg’l Response Team, supra note 45, at 115. 
320 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 151, at 20. 
321 George-Ares & Clark, supra note 37, at 1007. 
322 Effectiveness is a measure of how much oil is dispersed during a certain period of 
time. See George A. Sorial, Laboratory Testing to Determine Dispersion Predictabil-
ity of the Baffled Flask Test (BFT) and Swirling Flask Test (SFT) 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.bsee.gov/Research-and-Training/Technology-Assessment-and-Research/tar 
projects/500-599/513AA.aspx and http://perma.cc/7C9K-62HT (“Dispersant effectiveness is 
a measure of the amount of oil that has been dispersed into the water column compared to 
the amount that remains on the surface.”). 
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dispersant “varies with oil type, sea energy, oil conditions, salinity, and 
many other factors.”323 
 Dispersants also have vast unknown effects on the marine envi-
ronment that do not seem to have been sufficiently considered in ap-
proving Corexit in the NCP Produce Schedule and pre-approving its 
use in the relevant RCPs.324 For example, although previous testing of 
Corexit showed it to be biodegradable, many scientists were surprised 
that some ingredients of Corexit have persisted in the Gulf of Mexi-
co.325 Some research indicates that Corexit did not biodegrade proper-
ly because of colder temperatures.326 Many experts agree that the wide-
spread use of Corexit, especially thousands of feet underwater at the 
Macondo wellhead, constitutes a massive toxicological experiment for 
which there is very little determinative science.327 
 Despite all of the unknowns concerning the environmental im-
pacts of dispersants when used in unique conditions, Subpart J requires 
a minimal amount of testing for a dispersant to be listed in the NCP 
Product Schedule.328 First, a dispersant need only achieve a modest ef-
fectiveness of 45 percent,329 which is a comparatively low threshold 
when compared to 84.80 and 100 percent effectiveness, attributed to 
Saf-Ron Gold and Dispersit, respectively (when used in conjunction 
with a particular type of oil).330 Second, although a dispersant must be 
tested for toxicity, there is no toxicity threshold that a dispersant is re-
quired to meet.331 And even if there were, Subpart J’s toxicity results are 
unreliable because toxicity is tested only on two species—the Menidia 
and the Mysidopsis.332 Furthermore, there were gaps in the data and 
                                                                                                                      
323 ASTM F2059—06(2012)e1, ASTM Int’l, http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2059. 
htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/R8GE-TNN7. 
324 See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 78, at 17–18 (summary of 
comments from experts). 
325 Janet Raloff, Dispersants Persisted After BP Spill, Sci. News ( Jan. 27, 2011), http:// 
www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/69192/title/Dispersants_persisted_after_BP_spill, 
available at http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1002/scin.5591790506 and http://www. 
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326 See, e.g., Schrope, supra note 80. 
327 See Avery Fellow, Officials, Experts Voice Concerns on Dispersants, Courthouse News 
Serv. (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/08/04/29325.htm, available 
at http://www.perma.cc/0eFk4sBWKjz. 
328 See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 78, at 10. 
329 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.920(a) (2013). 
330 National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness Summaries, supra 
note 158. 
331 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(8). 
332 See supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text. 
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incorrect procedures for the minimal testing required of Corexit,333 
which, per the requirements of Subpart J, is tested by the industry 
without independent oversight.334 Overall, the existing lax standards 
for testing dispersants do not meet the standards established by UN-
CLOS Article 194 to take “all measures . . . necessary” to prevent, re-
duce, and control pollution of the marine environment.335 
 On the other hand, because a dispersant is not actually “approved” 
for use once listed in Subpart J, some might argue that the United 
States abided by the terms of Article 194.336 A dispersant must either be 
pre-authorized for use by an RRT or an AC before an FOSC may uni-
laterally approve it, otherwise the FOSC must first seek approval from 
the EPA and other stakeholders.337 Furthermore, RRTs and ACs may 
require additional testing before pre-authorizing dispersants for unilat-
eral authorization by an FOSC.338 The reality, however, is that the NCP 
Product Schedule has been treated as though all of the dispersants 
were pre-authorized for use without further testing, as Senator 
Whitehouse of Rhode Island has argued.339 Indeed, every dispersant 
listed in the NCP Product Schedule was pre-authorized for use in Fed-
eral Region IV and Federal Region VI, where the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill occurred, and these dispersants do not appear to have under-
gone further testing specific to that region.340 
 In summary, the United States currently requires only minimum 
testing of dispersants that cause “pollution of the marine environment,” 
while also complacently allowing a culture of dispersant pre-auth-
orization without additional testing that is specific to unique marine en-
vironments.341 Therefore, the United States did not use all means neces-
sary to ensure that dispersants are only used in circumstances that result 
in a net environmental benefit, and that the particular dispersant used is 
                                                                                                                      
333 Biello, supra note 56. 
334 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
335 See supra notes 315–334 and accompanying text. 
336 For example, the NCP Product Schedule states, “This listing does NOT mean that 
EPA approves, recommends, licenses, certifies, or authorizes the use of [Product Name] 
on an oil discharge.” Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 90. 
337 See supra notes 124–125, 134 and accompanying text. 
338 See U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 40. 
339 See Tilove, supra note 42. 
340 Other federal regions are outside the scope of this Article but could be a topic for 
future research. See supra notes 137–145 and accompanying text. 
341 See U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 40; see also U.S. Gov’t Account-
ability Office, supra note 78, at 10 (describing the standard tests for inclusion of a dis-
persant on the Product Schedule). 
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the optimal dispersant for a particular marine environment, which falls 
short of the standards stated in Article 194 of UNCLOS.342 
x. Recommendations for the United States’s Observance of UNCLOS 
 First, the United States should require that dispersants be tested in 
the particular marine environments for which they are pre-author-
ized.343 Even a division of Exxon Mobil conceded that dispersants 
should be assessed using actual conditions specific to the region of pre-
approval, as opposed to relying on generic data.344 Similarly, the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s ISPR Final Report on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
suggests that Subpart J should require chronic testing, indigenous spe-
cies testing, or testing of specific oil types with specific dispersants in 
specific water bodies.345 The Coast Guard’s recommendation is logically 
sound, but dispersants should also be tested at all depths of the ocean 
and on a wide enough variety of species to create reliable data on how a 
dispersant will affect any given species.346 
 Dispersants should also be required to undergo intensive testing in 
conditions specific to a given Federal Region if the dispersant is to be 
pre-authorized for use there. Assuming that research on the environ-
mental effects of dispersants will receive a boost after the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, this could be achieved by requiring RRTs to be updat-
ed annually or biannually to reflect new science on the use of disper-
sants.347 This will also help ensure that that the optimal dispersant poli-
cy is achieved in any given year. 
 Given the significant unknown environmental impacts of disper-
sants, the United States should also aggressively research the long-term 
effects of dispersants, both for surface and subsurface applications. This 
includes synthesizing information on chemical dispersants, which is cur-
rently scattered and too technical for policymakers to assess the science 
                                                                                                                      
342 Supra notes 315–341 and accompanying text. 
343 See infra notes 344–352 and accompanying text. 
344 George-Ares & Clark, supra note 37, at 1007. 
345 U.S. Coast Guard ISPR Team, supra note 4, at 41. 
346 See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, Dispersant Use During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Encyc. of Earth (Nov. 14, 
2010), http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/160620/, available at http://perma.cc/09 
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347 This recommendation was included in the Coast Guard’s ISPR Final Report. See 
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fully.348 If the United States wants to collaborate internationally to col-
lect data on the effects of dispersants, then the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, which collects, analyzes, and synthesis data on cli-
mate change, would be a prime model, albeit on a much smaller 
scale.349 An international panel on dispersants would also help the 
United States abide by Article 204 of UNCLOS, which requires States to 
“observe, measure, evaluate and analyze, by recognized scientific meth-
ods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine environment.”350 
 Although allocating government funds for environmental pro-
grams is often politically challenging in the United States,351 the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) has already taxed the petroleum 
industry billions of dollars for a wide variety of uses, including research 
and development.352 The OSLTF should increase taxes on the petrole-
um industry specifically to pay for research on the short-term and long-
term environmental effects of dispersants, unless the petroleum indus-
try shows a good faith effort to conduct the research itself. 
3. Article 195—Duty Not to Transfer Damage or Hazards or Transform 
One Type of Pollution into Another 
 Article 195 of UNCLOS imposes two obligations upon States in 
“taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the ma-
rine environment”: a duty not to “transfer, directly or indirectly, dam-
age or hazards from one area to another,” and a duty not to “transform 
one type of pollution into another.”353 During the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, the United States probably fell short of observing Article 195 of 
                                                                                                                      
348 Id. at 40. 
349 See Organization, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www. 
ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UnydCpTF1TQ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013), 
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May 2012 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office stated that “[a]ccording 
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350 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 204. 
351 See, e.g., Andrew Taylor, House GOP to Slash Environmental, Arts Funding, Associated 
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House Republicans to reduce the EPA budget by one-third, among other cuts). 
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House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Craig 
A. Bennett, director of National Pollution Funds Center, that “[t]he current OSLTF bal-
ance is approximately $2.3 billion”). 
353 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 195. 
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UNCLOS because the U.S. government’s authorization of the use of 
dispersants (1) transferred damage from the ocean surface and shore-
lines to the water column and deep sea environment, and (2) trans-
formed an oil slick, which is one type of pollution, into a physically dis-
tinct oil plume or cloud.354 Some commentators might interpret Article 
195 of UNCLOS in light of Article 192 of UNCLOS, such that the terms 
of Article 195 would not be breached if the pollution is “transferred” or 
“transformed” in order to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment, but this section will not focus on such an argument.355 
i. “Transfer” 
 This subsection addresses the duty under Article 195 of UNCLOS 
not to “transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area 
to another” and concludes that the United States probably failed to ob-
serve the provision.356 The ordinary meaning of “transfer” provides 
strong evidence that the United States did not meet the standards im-
posed by Article 195.357 Although the terms “transfer,” “damage or haz-
ards,” and “transform” are not defined in UNCLOS and do not appear 
to have been discussed in the record of UNCLOS negotiations,358 
“transfer” within the scope of Article 195 has often been interpreted to 
imply “physical movement from place to place, including the transfer 
of alien species.”359 Likewise, Webster’s Third International Dictionary 
defines “transfer” as “to carry or take from one person or place to an-
other.”360 
 Based on the ordinary meaning of the term “transfer,” the United 
States likely transferred oil—which is a “damage or hazard” under the 
plain meaning of those words because dispersants are toxic and have at 
least some destructive effect on wildlife and marine ecosystems361— 
                                                                                                                      
354 Infra notes 355–379 and accompanying text. 
355 See, e.g., supra notes 226–230 and accompanying text (discussion of net environ-
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358 Center for Oceans Law and Policy, supra note 240, at 72. 
359 Id. 
360 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 343 (3d ed. 1993). According 
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Convention, supra note 226, art. 31. Therefore, dictionaries can be the first place for in-
ternational scholars to turn when interpreting specific words. 
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from one place to another.362 Specifically, the use of dispersants “trans-
ferred” oil from the surface of the ocean to the subsurface water col-
umn.363 In fact, a major motivation for using dispersants is to shift dam-
age away from surface species, shorelines, and wetlands, where there 
are many sensitive ecosystems and endangered species.364 Therefore, 
transferring oil into the water column is not a mere side effect of the 
use of dispersants, but rather is one of the primary purposes of disper-
sants.365 
 Furthermore, under UNCLOS the water column is probably con-
sidered a different “area” than the ocean surface and shoreline.366 The 
ordinary meaning of “area” is “a section, portion, or part.”367 The water 
column is likely a different “area” from the water surface because both 
are distinct zones of the ocean with different marine species, tempera-
tures, habitats, and other features.368 Even if the water column is not a 
different “area” than the ocean surface, the water column is certainly a 
different area than the shore—where a larger amount of oil would have 
ended up without the use of dispersants.369 Based on the plain meaning 
of these words, the United States’s authorization of the use of disper-
sants, by allowing the “transfer” of “damage or hazards” from “one area 
to another,” did not meet the standards of Article 194 of UNCLOS.370 
ii. “Transform” 
 Article 195 of UNCLOS imposes a duty to enact and enforce laws 
and regulations to restrict the transformation of one type of pollution 
                                                                                                                      
362 The use of dispersants led to the transfer of oil from the ocean surface and shore-
lines to the water column. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, supra note 151, at 143. 
363 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
364 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
365 Eur. Mar. Safety Agency, Manual on the Applicability of Oil Spill Disper-
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369 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, supra note 151, at 17. 
370 Supra notes 356–369 and accompanying text. 
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into another, but the United States likely did not meet the standards 
imposed by Article 195.371 Although UNCLOS does not specifically de-
fine “transform,” a dictionary can provide the ordinary meaning of the 
word.372 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “trans-
form” as “to change the outward form or appearance.”373 Likewise, spe-
cifically in the context of UNCLOS, “transform” has previously been 
interpreted to refer to a change in the quality or the nature of the pol-
lution.374 
 Considering the ordinary meaning of “transform,” using disper-
sants probably violates Article 195’s prohibition not to “transform one 
type of pollution into another.”375 The use of dispersants transforms oil 
from an oil slick into oil droplets, which results in a change of the oil’s 
“outward form or appearance,” or quality and nature.376 An oil slick is a 
mass of floating oil, primarily on the surface of the water, but dispersed 
oil droplets are akin to a cloud of small milky particles.377 These drop-
lets are different in size, buoyancy, and mass and can include the added 
properties of dispersants.378 Therefore, based on the ordinary meaning 
of “transform,” the use of dispersants to transform an oil slick into a 
cloud of oil droplets does not meet the standards of UNCLOS Article 
195.379 
iii. Scope of Article 195 
 The legislative history of UNCLOS offers further support that dis-
persants used to mitigate the effects of ocean pollution fall within the 
scope of Article 195.380 Currently, Article 195 imposes a duty on a State 
to take “measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the ma-
rine environment . . . .”381 The drafting history of UNCLOS shows that 
                                                                                                                      
371 Infra notes 372–378 and accompanying text. 
372 See Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 31. 
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381 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 195. 
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the scope of Article 195 was expanded from only including measures to 
“prevent” pollution to measures to “prevent and control pollution,” 
then finally measures to “prevent, reduce, and control pollution.”382 
The previous language notably does not require taking measures to 
“reduce” pollution of the marine environment, which is now included 
in Article 195.383 The change in language shows that the drafters of 
UNCLOS intended the scope of Article 195 to include mechanisms 
that were meant to reduce pollution. The primary purpose of disper-
sants in response to oil spills is to reduce pollution.384 Therefore, the 
use of dispersants likely falls within the scope of Article 195 of UN-
CLOS. 
iv. Recommendations for Observance of UNCLOS 
 The United States, by failing to enact and enforce sufficient laws 
and regulations, has permitted the use of dispersants to “transfer” dam-
age or hazards from one area of the ocean to another and “transform” 
one type of pollution into another.385 The terms of Article 195 seem to 
require that pollution not be transferred or transformed in an attempt 
“reduce” pollution of the marine environment.386 Furthermore, the 
fact that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred in the Gulf of Mexi-
co, and not in international waters, does not mean that the United 
States can ignore UNCLOS, because Part XII of UNCLOS is not limited 
to international waters.387 Therefore, abiding by Article 195 of UN-
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CLOS could require the United States to make the use of dispersants 
illegal if the effect of such chemicals continues to be merely transfer-
ring pollution into the water column in the form of an oil plume.388 In 
such a scenario, the United States would need to continue develop-
ment of alternate oil spill cleanup methods, such as in-situ burning and 
mechanical recovery of oil. 
 Another argument is that oil spill dispersants should be used even 
if they transfer or transform the pollution if a net environmental bene-
fit would result. If this argument prevails, the United States should es-
tablish a regulatory review process that only allows the use of disper-
sants when such a net environmental benefit can be proven by the 
highest scientific standards. More generally, at the very least the United 
States should continue to study the effects of oil plumes.389 
IV. Looking Ahead: Using Genetically Engineered 
Microorganisms to Clean Up Spills 
 Hopefully the Deepwater Horizon oil spill will not repeat itself, but 
a significant chance exists that another massive oil spill will pollute 
America’s waters in the future. Such a scenario would once again raise 
difficult questions regarding proper methods for oil spill cleanup. One 
potential method is to use genetically engineered microorganisms 
(GEMs) that are custom-designed to clean up oil spills, either in the 
form of biosurfactants or oil-eating microorganisms.390 
 Scientists have already developed GEMs to use during oil spills.391 
Although none of these organisms have been used yet in the marine 
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environment, this technology might come under consideration for fu-
ture use.392 This part first discusses the risks of releasing GEMs, includ-
ing the potential for a global catastrophe.393 This part then explores 
whether the United States’s laws meet the standards established by 
UNCLOS as that treaty pertains to the release of GEMs into the marine 
environment.394 
A. Introduction to Genetic Engineering 
 Genetic engineering is the engineering of living organisms to cre-
ate new characteristics.395 Essentially, biotechnologists are able to select 
useful bits of genetic code from two or more organisms and synthesize 
them into a new organism with certain desired traits.396 Genetic engi-
neering traditionally uses “recombinant DNA” techniques by stitching 
together existing strands of DNA to create new organisms.397 More re-
cently, scientists have made great strides in the field of synthetic biolo-
gy—the engineering of organisms with DNA that is chemically synthe-
sized (or “printed”) from a computer—which allows greater flexibility 
to customize the traits of genetically engineered microorganisms.398 
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114 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:63 
Extreme forms of synthetic biology can involve the creation of life es-
sentially from scratch.399 
 The technology behind genetic engineering is rapidly advanc-
ing.400 Traditionally, genetic engineering is perhaps best known for al-
tering the genetic makeup of crops to increase drought resilience, add 
more nutrients, bolster pest resistance, or create other beneficial at-
tributes.401 Genetic engineering can also be used to create new viruses, 
disease-curing microorganisms, animals with novel biological makeups, 
and, as discussed below, microorganisms to clean up oil spills.402 
B. GEMs and Oil Spills 
 GEMs could be used to clean up oil spills in two ways—as biosurfac-
tants (Corexit is a chemical, rather than biological, surfactant) or as a 
method of bioremediation.403 First, a dispersant made of biosurfactants 
uses biological microorganisms rather than an oil-based formula to dis-
perse oil sheens into droplets that microorganisms can consume more 
easily.404 Currently, biosurfactants are generally not as cost-effective as 
oil-based surfactants, though some scientists assert that a bioengineered 
surfactant would be able to do a superior job of dispersing oil spills— 
and without the toxicity that is inherent to an oil-based formula.405 
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 Second, a GEM could be used in bioremediation efforts during an 
oil spill.406 Bioremediation is defined as the “use of microorganisms to 
accelerate the degradation of oil or other environmental contami-
nants.”407 Natural communities of microorganisms already consume oil 
and eventually release carbon dioxide and water.408 Scientists would 
seek to improve these biodegrading abilities through genetic engineer-
ing.409 The costs and difficulties associated with cleaning toxic waste 
sites make bioremediation a potentially attractive technology.410 Cur-
rently, GEMs are no more superior at breaking down oil than their nat-
ural counterparts, but progress in genetic engineering technologies 
and an increased understanding of how microorganisms consume pol-
lution will likely drive advancement in this field.411 
C. GEMs and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 GEMs became a significant topic of conversation during the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.412 Some people speculated that British Pe-
troleum (BP) might have even secretly deployed GEMs to help clean 
up the spill.413 Such people have cited mysterious rashes and other skin 
conditions, and dubbed the resulting human and environmental health 
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effects as the “Blue Plague.”414 Even major environmentalists showed 
some concern: A consortium of 154 environmental groups requested 
information from the EPA that lists, inter alia, “any natural and/or bio-
engineered bacteria . . . used in response to the BP spill.”415 No sub-
stantial evidence was ever established to prove that BP used GEMs, 
though, and until shown otherwise, a safe assumption is that BP did not 
use GEMs. Still, during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, a Columbia 
University chemical engineer delivered a presentation to the U.S. gov-
ernment on GEMs in the context of oil spill cleanup,416 and the Na-
tional Science Foundation has since provided money to develop a ge-
netically engineered dispersant called “FA-Glu.”417 
D. Potential Danger of GEMs 
 This section presents a brief overview of the potential short-term 
and long-term risks to human and environmental health presented by 
the release of GEMs into the marine environment, including the risk of 
a global catastrophe.418 A global catastrophic risk (GCR) is a risk that 
has a potential to significantly harm humans on a global scale, regard-
less of probability.419 Examples of GCRs include emerging technologies 
such as biological engineering, artificial intelligence, advanced nano-
technologies, climate change, financial collapse, government failure, 
natural and artificial diseases outbreak, and nuclear war.420 While many 
GCRs have an extremely low probability of occurrence,421 the conse-
quences of a global catastrophe would be so severe that humanity 
should take great caution not to let such a catastrophe occur. Some 
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forms of biotechnology, such as genetically engineered viruses, current-
ly present a GCR.422 
 In the short term, some commentators argue that a “highly modi-
fied” GEM probably would not survive in the marine environment at 
all, though a microorganism that is merely tweaked could have a better 
chance at survival.423 Other commentators argue that genetic engineer-
ing could increase a microorganism’s competitive advantage, and that 
the microorganism could then spread across vast distances by sea cur-
rent,424 for example, which could disrupt the ecosystem. Some existing 
microorganisms also present health risks; for example, dinoflagellate has 
spread across the globe and caused paralytic shellfish poisoning, an 
ailment that can cause death in extreme cases.425 GEMs could have sim-
ilar or worse effects.426 Despite these risks, there does not appear to be 
evidence that GEMs in the ocean environment pose a GCR to humanity 
in the short term. 
 The long-term risks from GEMs are potentially much greater.427 
One potential negative effect is that a GEM could outcompete its natu-
ral counterparts,428 which could have a long-term cascading effect on 
the ecosystem. This risk is compounded by the fact that if a GEM can 
survive in the marine environment, the GEM might become impossible 
                                                                                                                      
422 Seth Baum & Grant Wilson, The Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioen-
gineering, Ethics in Biology, Engineering and Med. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), 
available at http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc_BioengineeringGCR.pdf and http://perma.cc/ 
0ihem8RPJT4. 
423 See Michele S. Garfinkel et al., Synthetic Biology, in From Birth to Death and 
Bench to Clinic: The Hastings Center Bioethics Briefing Book for Journalists, 
Policymakers, and Campaigns 163–67 (2008), available at http://www.thehastingscenter. 
org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing_Book/synthetic%20biology%20chapter.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/JQ9F-BKJS. 
424 Raymond A. Zilinskas & Peter J. Balint, Genetically Engineered Marine Or-
ganisms: Environmental and Economic Risks 117 (1998). 
425 Sabitiyu Abosede Lawal, Ballast Water Management Convention, 2004: Towards 
Combating Unintentional Transfer of Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens 33–35 
(Aug. 2011) (Master of Laws thesis, Dalhousie University), available at http://goo.gl/ 
2EircP and http://perma.cc/C85G-YDNV. 
426 See, e.g., Gary Marchant, Modified Rules for Modified Bugs: Balancing Safety and Efficien-
cy in the Regulation of Deliberate Release of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms, 1 Harv. J. of L. 
& Tech. 163, 207 (1988). 
427 Infra notes 428–438 and accompanying text. 
428 Mae-Wan Ho & Ricarda A. Steinbrecher, Fatal Flaws in Food Safety Assessment: Critique of 
the Joint FAO/WHO Biotechnology and Food Safety Report, Part 7.4, Physicians and Scientists 
for Responsible Application of Sci. and Tech., http://www.psrast.org/fao96.htm (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/LL6W-G5H9 (“Individual strains of genet-
ically engineered microorganisms . . . can survive and out-compete wild-type strains.”). 
118 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:63 
to eradicate.429 Studies have shown that the ability of genetically engi-
neered bacteria to survive in marine environments is at least equivalent 
to many naturally occurring species.430 A GEM could also transfer 
“nonessential but highly selectable traits” such as “antibiotic resistance, 
pathogenicity, and enzymes to metabolize new resources” to a natural 
microorganism via horizontal gene transfer.431 Such a process could 
have harmful effects on the marine environment and could be patho-
genic to humans or marine organisms,432 though not much is known 
regarding the extent to which synthetic genomes can be transferred. 
 So-called “biological containment” methods exist, including kill-
switches and engineering organisms so that they can’t transfer genes,433 
but such biological containment methods are not effective in every sin-
gle bacterium out of billions.434 While layering several such safeguards 
on top of one another could provide additional protection, such a 
method is not a guaranteed mode of safety.435 Overall, the long-term 
effects of releasing a GEM into the marine environment are extremely 
difficult to gauge.436 Because some commentators argue that there is a 
potential for a catastrophic effect on the marine environment,437 which 
could also have harmful effects on humanity, great caution should be 
used before releasing a GEM into the marine environment.438 
E. UNCLOS and GEMs 
 GEMs used during oil spills present a threat of significant environ-
mental harm,439 so determining the obligations that UNCLOS could 
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impose upon the United States as customary international law is pru-
dent, even if this biotechnology is nowhere close to being used in the 
field. As discussed below, the primary obligation arising from UNCLOS 
for the release of GEMs into the marine environment comes from Arti-
cle 196, which, in pertinent part, regulates the introduction of “alien or 
new” species.440 Applying Article 194 to GEMs probably does not add 
any additional insights beyond the dispersant framework discussed 
above.441 Therefore, the United States regulatory scheme that applies to 
GEMs should meet the basic obligations arising from Article 196. 
1. Article 196 of UNCLOS 
 Article 196 of UNCLOS establishes a duty of States to take “all 
measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the ma-
rine environment resulting from . . . the intentional or accidental intro-
duction of species, alien or new, to a particular part of the marine envi-
ronment, which may cause significant and harmful changes thereto.”442 
i. “Alien” Species 
 Although UNCLOS does not define the term “alien,” this word’s 
ordinary meaning443 is “a species occurring outside its normal distribu-
tion” or “any species that enters an ecosystem beyond its historic 
range.”444 Therefore, a GEM is “alien” if it is a modified version of an 
organism that is outside of its natural range in the area in question.445 
On the other hand, a GEM that is a slightly modified version of a mi-
croorganism within its historic range might not be “alien.”446 
ii. “New” Species 
 Under UNCLOS, a “new” species probably includes a GEM.447 Alt-
hough UNCLOS does not define “new,” Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary defines “new” as “being other than the former or old: 
having freshly come into a relation (as use, connection, or func-
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tion),”448 whereas the Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines “new” 
as “not existing before, made, introduced or discovered recently.”449 In 
the context of species, these definitions imply that a “new” species is 
one that has never existed before, which would include a species creat-
ed through genetic engineering techniques.450 On the other hand, this 
interpretation is still slightly ambiguous because a species that is merely 
genetically tweaked may have “existed before,” albeit in a slightly dif-
ferent form.451 
 More evidence of the meaning of “new” organisms can be found 
by looking at the drafting history of UNCLOS.452 A representative from 
Norway who introduced a proposal that was the basis of Article 196 ex-
plained that the Article covered “the introduction of living organisms 
not previously existing in the seas or by the transfer of a form of marine 
life to an area where the implications of its existence were unknown.”453 
Under this explanation, a GEM would likely be considered to have nev-
er previously existed in the seas, though this notion is ambiguous as 
applied to organisms with slight genetic alterations.454 
iii. “All Measures Necessary” 
 First, the modifier “all” means that a State must take every possible 
measure, “both technical and legal,” to achieve the purpose of Article 
196.455 Second, use of the strict term “necessary” rather than a looser 
term such as “appropriate” (which is used elsewhere in UNCLOS) indi-
cates that the measures to be taken to protect the environment from 
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alien or new species should not be influenced or diluted by non-
environmental concerns (such as money or convenience).456 Nonethe-
less, the phrase “all measures necessary” is inherently open to multiple 
interpretations, and UNCLOS does not elaborate upon what this provi-
sion means in practice, which makes Article 196 difficult to enforce.457 
iv. “Prevent, Reduce, or Control” 
 The phrase “prevent, reduce, or control” is somewhat ambiguous 
but seems to indicate that failing to prevent the introduction of an al-
ien or new species into the marine environment is not a per se violation 
of Article 196, so long as sufficient preventative measures are taken.458 
Because Article 196 applies to measures taken to prevent the spread of 
invasive species from ballast water, this looser language also concedes 
that stopping the spread of all alien or new organisms is nearly impos-
sible.459 
v. “May” 
 The term “may” (“control pollution . . . resulting from . . . species, 
alien or new . . . which may cause significant and harmful changes”) 
“emphasizes the need to take action where a material risk is indicat-
ed.”460 In other words, deliberate action must be taken to protect the 
marine environment from possible but unproven risks from alien or new 
species. 
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vi. “Significant and Harmful” 
 Finally, a violation of Article 196 constitutes actual or potential 
changes of the marine environment that are “significant and harm-
ful.”461 The phrase “significant and harmful” is inherently subjective, 
and UNCLOS does not define these terms. Nonetheless, “harmful” 
changes to the environment can be understood to be those that cause 
environmental health hazards, impair biological diversity, and cause 
other types of environmental degradation.462 Furthermore, “signifi-
cant” changes to the environment include changes that meet a mini-
mum threshold of severity and are more than “negligible,” “apprecia-
ble,” or “nominal.”463 
2. U.S. Law and Regulations Pertaining to the Release of GEMs into 
the Marine Environment 
 The United States regulates GEMs under the Coordinated Frame-
work for Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated Framework”).464 
The Coordinated Framework divides regulatory duties regarding genet-
ic engineering among various agencies based on their traditional du-
ties, with each agency promulgating new biotechnology regulations.465 
The EPA covers bioengineered microbial pesticides and microorgan-
isms, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) covers plant pests, and the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) covers food products.466 Because releasing 
a GEM into the marine environment seems generally unrelated to food 
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products, this subsection discusses only certain EPA and APHIS regula-
tions and omits FDA regulations.467 
i. Toxic Substances Control Act 
 The Toxic Substances Control Act regulates certain chemical sub-
stances and/or mixtures by means of reporting, record keeping, test-
ing, and permitting requirements.468 Per the Coordinated Framework, 
in 1997 the EPA promulgated a regulation that interpreted the phrase 
“chemical substances” to apply to “new chemical substances” and “bio-
technology products.”469 While some substances such as foods, drugs, 
and pesticides are excluded from TSCA, GEMs to be used in an oil spill 
fall within the statute’s scope.470 Therefore, TSCA imposes various re-
quirements upon an actor who wishes to release a GEM into the marine 
environment.471 
 Foremost, TSCA requires manufacturers of chemical substances 
for commercial purposes—including substances used for the break-
down of pollutants—to submit their products for EPA review via a mi-
crobial commercial activity notice.472 The EPA then conducts a risk as-
sessment.473 A GEM can receive pre-market approval unless the EPA 
finds within ninety days that there is an unreasonable risk of adverse 
effects on human health or the environment.474 Otherwise, the EPA 
takes the necessary actions to regulate any unreasonable risks.475 
 TSCA does not define “unreasonable risk,” but based on the stat-
ute’s legislative history, the EPA’s risk assessment determines whether a 
substance presents an unreasonable risk to human health or the envi-
ronment by weighing the probability, magnitude, and severity of harm 
                                                                                                                      
467 Supra notes 464–466 and accompanying text. 
468 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
469 62 C.F.R. § 17910 (1997). 
470 See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B) (2012). 
471 See, e.g., Presidential Comm’n on the Study of Bioethical Issues, supra note 
466, at 92–94. 
472 40 C.F.R. § 725.105 (1997). 
473 Making a Finding on Unreasonableness of Risk, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa.gov/oppt/newchems/pubs/unrerisk.htm (last updated Apr. 3, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/0a78whFEhLh (“In considering risk, EPA considers factors including 
environmental effects, distribution, and fate of the chemical substance in the environ-
ment, disposal methods, waste water treatment, use of protective equipment and engineer-
ing controls, use patterns, and market potential of the chemical substance.”). 
474 See Richard A. Denison, Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. 10020, 
10020–21 (2009), available at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/9279_Denison_10_ 
Elements_TSCA_Reform_0.pdf and http://perma.cc/0k3PtxUMiPD. 
475 See id. at 10024. 
124 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:63 
to humans and the environment against the substance’s societal bene-
fits.476 Such social benefits include economic considerations and the 
availability of alternatives.477 If the EPA determines there is an “unrea-
sonable risk” to human health or the environment, then the agency 
may take regulatory risk management actions to eliminate the unrea-
sonable risk, which could include varying levels of restrictions or a total 
ban.478 
 There are several elements of TSCA that fall below the standards 
of Article 196 of UNCLOS.479 One major problem is that TSCA places 
the burden on the EPA to prove that a substance poses an unreasona-
ble risk of adverse effects on the environment.480 The EPA must also 
show that the actions it takes under TSCA are the least burdensome 
option, which, according to the EPA, makes the EPA less likely to ban 
or restrict substances under TSCA.481 To abide by UNCLOS, TSCA 
should require the proponent of a GEM to prove its long-term and 
short-term safety, both to the environment and human health. Like-
wise, proponents of releasing a GEM into the marine environment 
should have to address potential worst-case scenarios, including the 
possibility of a global catastrophe. 
 Article 196 of UNCLOS requires a State to sufficiently protect the 
marine environment from GEMs that “may cause significant and harm-
ful changes.”482 As discussed above, GEMs released into the marine en-
vironment pose significant ecological risks, as well as some danger to 
humans, and therefore almost certainly may cause significant and 
harmful changes to the marine environment.483 Therefore, for TSCA to 
comply with UNCLOS, the statute might need to prohibit the release of 
GEMs into the marine environment until they have been proven safe. 
 Another problem is the discretionary nature of TSCA. On one 
hand, if the EPA definitively finds that there is an unreasonable risk of 
                                                                                                                      
476 Making a Finding on Unreasonableness of Risk, supra note 473. 
477 U.S. General Accounting Office, Toxic Substances Control Act—Legislative 
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gao.gov/t2pbat2/152799.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0KU7gnELzhG. 
478 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1)–(2) (2006); see also Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl Prot. 
Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing the duty of the EPA to pick the 
least burdensome measure to eliminate an “unreasonable risk”). 
479 Infra notes 480–492 and accompanying text. 
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Denison, supra note 474, at 10020–21. 
481 Id. 
482 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 196(1). 
483 Supra notes 418–438 and accompanying text. 
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harm to human health or the environment, then it must take regulatory 
measures to address these concerns.484 If, however there is insufficient 
information for the EPA to conduct a reasoned health and environ-
mental impact evaluation, which in turn could result in an “unreasona-
ble risk of harm,” then the EPA “may” prohibit or limit the manufac-
ture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of the 
substance.485 In other words, EPA action is discretionary for unproven 
risks.486 Article 196 of UNCLOS requires a state to protect the marine 
environment from GEMs that “may cause significant and harmful 
changes,”487 which would seem to require the EPA to prohibit or limit a 
substance with unproven, but possible, risks of significant and harmful 
changes to the marine environment. 
 One final problem is that TSCA allows for the consideration of 
non-environmental factors when determining whether an unreasona-
ble risk to human health or the environment exists.488 For example, the 
EPA could determine that the societal benefits of releasing a bioengi-
neered microorganism into the marine environment outweigh the 
probability and magnitude of harm to human health and the environ-
ment despite there being a risk of “significant and harmful changes” to 
the marine environment.489 This is noncompliant with UNCLOS, which 
requires “all measures necessary” (rather than appropriate or socially 
beneficial) to protect the environment from alien or new species.490 To 
comply with Article 196, TSCA probably should require at least a check-
list of detailed, stringent, and mandatory regulatory environmental 
guidelines to direct decision-making,491 in addition to specific rules 
about how to “evaluate or reduce” risks arising from GEMs,492 without 
consideration of societal benefits such as economic considerations and 
availability of alternatives. 
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488 See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1215 (describing the EPA’s required consider-
ation of environmental, economic, and social impacts of its actions under TSCA). 
489 See Denison, supra note 474, at 10021–22. 
490 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, art. 196(1). 
491 See U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 477, at 15–21. 
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ii. Plant Protection Act Regulations 
 Under the Plant Protection Act, APHIS in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture493 regulates the introduction of genetically engineered or-
ganisms—plants, insects, and microorganisms—that are “plant pests or 
are believed to be plant pests.”494 APHIS established the Biotechnology 
Regulatory Services program in 2002 to focus on its biotechnology reg-
ulatory functions.495 In turn, “introduction” includes the “importation, 
interstate movement, and release into the environment” of a genetically 
engineered organism.496 A person who seeks to introduce what is, or is 
believed to be, a plant pest typically must apply for a permit from 
APHIS.497 
 GEMs released into the marine environment to clean up an oil 
spill would fall under the scope of APHIS regulations if they pose a risk 
to plant health, in which case they would require an APHIS permit.498 
To obtain an APHIS permit, applicants must send a detailed applica-
tion to the Biotechnology Permits unit of Biotechnology, Biologics, and 
Environmental Protection, which reviews data about the actual and po-
tential dangers of the organism to plants, explores potential alterna-
tives, and discusses the need for the bioengineered organism.499 If 
APHIS concludes that there is a significant impact on the environment, 
then it must take the procedural step of preparing an environmental 
impact statement.500 Finally, when APHIS grants a permit, it may in-
clude safety conditions to reduce the risk of harm to plant health.501 
                                                                                                                      
493 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 (2013). 
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 One problem with using APHIS to regulate GEMs is that the scope 
of APHIS is limited to agriculture, with a goal of curbing the spread of 
plant pests.502 As a general rule, under the Coordinated Framework, 
APHIS generally regulates genetically engineered plants, while the EPA 
regulates GEMs, pesticides, and other life forms.503 One critique of the 
Coordinated Framework is that APHIS, pursuant to the Farmland Pro-
tection Policy Act, is directed merely to “assess and manage plant pests” 
(organisms that harm plants)504 rather than also consider larger risks to 
human health or the environment, regardless of the consequences for 
plants. Therefore, APHIS could potentially approve the release of a 
GEM into the environment if APHIS does not perceive an actual or po-
tential plant pest—even if the GEM poses major risks to human and 
environmental health, such as virulence.505 This situation appears to 
contradict UNCLOS Article 196’s mandate to sufficiently protect the 
marine environment from a GEM that may cause significant and harm-
ful changes.506 One potential improvement would be to expand the 
scope of “plant pest” to include organisms that not only pose risks to 
plant health but also to human and environmental health. 
 Another problem is that the general standard that APHIS uses to 
determine whether a GEM is a “plant pest” is whether the “donor, re-
cipient, vector, or vector agent” involved in genetic engineering is itself 
a plant pest.507 APHIS can regulate genetically engineered organisms if 
it has “reason to believe” the organisms are a plant pest, regardless of 
whether the organism contains plant pest genetics.508 But APHIS needs 
a “reasonable basis” for believing the organism to be a plant pest, and 
“[i]t is unclear how difficult it would be for APHIS to meet this stand-
ard.”509 In practice, APHIS has found that many genetically engineered 
                                                                                                                      
(describing the duty of APHIS to conduct an EIS for major federal actions significantly 
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plants are not “plant pests.”510 To take “all measures necessary” to pro-
tect the marine environment from significant and harmful changes 
from alien species, APHIS should include all GEMs as “plant pests” ra-
ther than just those that have plant pest DNA. Furthermore, consider-
ing the unknown but potentially massive risks posed by the release of 
GEMs into the marine environment, including the irreversibility of re-
leasing such organisms, APHIS permit applicants should have to 
demonstrate that the microorganisms will not cause significant and 
harmful changes to the environment nor will they cause a global catas-
trophe.511 
iii. National Institute of Health Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant 
DNA Molecules 
 The National Institute of Health Guidelines for Research Involving 
Recombinant DNA Molecules (“NIH Guidelines”) specify practices for 
constructing and handling recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
molecules and organisms, and viruses containing recombinant DNA 
molecules.512 Although the NIH Guidelines are important to consider 
for researchers working with recombinant DNA, they are outside the 
scope of the analysis in this Article for several reasons. First, the NIH 
Guidelines only apply to recombinant DNA research that receives NIH 
funding, whereas abiding by Article 196 of UNCLOS would require 
measures that apply to all actors handling GEMs.513 Furthermore, the 
NIH Guidelines apply to the research stage of genetic engineering, 
whereas this analysis is focused on the later field release stage. 
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3. Conclusion of UNCLOS and GEMs Under Article 196 
 With genetic engineering techniques becoming increasingly so-
phisticated, and with oil and gas development expanding into the Arc-
tic and other regions, development of bioengineered organisms that 
serve as both dispersants and as oil-eating bacteria will continue.514 To 
comply with Article 196 of UNCLOS as customary international law, 
U.S. laws and regulations should be modernized in acknowledgment of 
the reality that GEMs pose unknown and potentially dangerous effects 
on the marine environment and human health.515 
 Furthermore, lawmakers should consider clarifying the duties of 
the various agencies involved in the Coordinated Framework so that 
the agencies do not have overlapping responsibilities.516 In the alterna-
tive, lawmakers should consider creating a new legal regime crafted 
specifically for GEMs. Finally, the United States should take additional 
actions to bolster biosafety and biosecurity pertaining to GEMs to en-
sure that GEMs do not enter the environment outside of the regulatory 
requirements of the Coordinated Framework. Such measures could 
include “genetic features” to minimize chances of an undesired prolif-
eration of GEMs, increased environmental risk assessment, ensuring 
there is adequate research on risks before a large-scale release, train 
professionals to minimize risk, and other measures.517 
 One major factor driving the development of GEMs is the large 
influx of research and development money.518 For example, biologist 
Craig Venter struck a $300 million deal with Exxon Mobil to develop 
bioengineered algae that digests carbon dioxide and creates oil.519 BP 
similarly contracted Venter’s Synthetic Genomics to develop a GEM 
designed to recover more hydrocarbon from well sites.520 The value of 
this deal, however, had not been disclosed on Synthetic Genomics’s 
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website as of late 2013.521 Although much of the influx in money has 
gone toward bioengineered algae research, gas and oil companies face 
massive financial consequences from environmental disasters.522 BP, for 
example, reached a deal to settle a class action lawsuit by businesses 
and individuals affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill for $7.8 bil-
lion, in addition to criminal penalties.523 Therefore, a strong financial 
incentive exists to develop GEMs that can effectively clean up oil 
spills.524 Because market pressure will likely exist to continue the devel-
opment of these microorganisms, their risks should be considered now 
rather than later. 
Conclusion 
 By authorizing the broad use of dispersants in the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, the United States likely did not meet the standards 
represented in Article 194 and Article 195 of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Regarding Article 194, the 
United States failed to take “all measures . . . necessary” using the “best 
practical means” to prevent, reduce, and control “pollution of the ma-
rine environment . . . .” Fulfilling the obligation of Article 194 relative 
to dispersants is possible only if the authorization of such chemicals 
results in a net environmental benefit, and if the dispersants are the 
optimal dispersants available. Furthermore, in “taking measures to pre-
vent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment,” the 
United States fell short of Article 195 because it transferred “damage or 
hazards from one area into another” and transformed “one type of pol-
lution into another” through its use of dispersants. This Article rec-
ommends that the United States take certain measures to update the 
National Contingency Plan, considering the known and unknown envi-
ronmental risks posed by dispersants. 
 Additionally, looking ahead to the potential use of genetically en-
gineered microorganisms in the ocean environment to clean up oil 
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spills, this Article concludes that the U.S. government has not taken 
sufficient measures to meet the standards presented in UNCLOS Arti-
cle 196, which requires States to “take all measures necessary to pre-
vent, reduce and control . . . the intentional or accidental introduction 
of species, alien or new . . . which may cause significant and harmful 
changes [to the marine environment].” This Article recommends that 
the United States update the Coordinated Framework to reduce broad 
agency discretion and economic considerations regarding the EPA, and 
a focus on plant health regarding the Department of Agriculture’s An-
imal and Plant Health Inspection Service. 
 Why did the United States authorize British Petroleum to use a 
dispersant with unknown effects that could damage the ocean for dec-
ades? Perhaps because oil slicks drift upon the ocean surface and onto 
public beaches and wetlands in clear view, but dispersed oil plumes 
creep around the depths of the ocean, where they are difficult to locate 
and monitor. Whatever the underlying purpose for authorizing the use 
of more than 1.7 million gallons of Corexit in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
laws and regulations that authorize the use of dispersants should be 
reformed with environmental protection in mind. 
 Likewise, the stakes are increasing dramatically as the United 
States develops new, potentially dangerous technologies such as bioen-
gineered biosurfactants and bacteria designed to consume oil more 
efficiently. These technologies have unknown consequences and could 
wreak havoc on the environment and, perhaps in the long-term, even 
cause a global catastrophe. The United States must soon come to terms 
with the vast risks presented by its massive fossil fuel dependence and 
the methods used to clean up associated environmental disasters. 
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